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FROM BACKPACKS TO BLACKBERRIES: (RE)EXAMINING
NEW JERSEY V. T.L.O. IN THE AGE OF THE CELL PHONE†
ABSTRACT
When the U.S. Supreme Court decided New Jersey v. T.L.O., cellular
phones had yet to emerge in American society and public schools.
Contemplating a world of physical possessions and tangible objects, the
T.L.O. Court determined that public school students may expect only a
minimal amount of privacy in their backpacks, purses, and other belongings
while at school. The Court used these diminished privacy expectations to
establish a heavily reduced standard of Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable searches conducted by teachers and administrators.
The pervasiveness of cell phones in today’s schools, however, has arguably
swayed the balance. As students, like the rest of society, increasingly rely on
their cell phones for a vast range of private purposes, they have demanded a
reevaluation of the heavily abridged safeguards the T.L.O. Court prescribed.
Calls for heightened Fourth Amendment protection in students’ cell phones
arise in an era when school authorities often search the stored contents on
these phones (including call histories, text messages, photos, and information
accessed on the Internet) in the name of maintaining an orderly educational
environment. The mounting uncertainty over the privacy students can expect in
their cell phones against school officials’ intrusions has left schools vulnerable
to widespread opposition and rights-based litigation. Students often reflexively
believe that they should have more privacy rights in their cell phones than the
established standard provides. This Comment develops a legal argument that
lends support to this intuition.
With an eye toward respecting students’ heightened expectations of privacy
in their cell phones, this Comment advances the novel argument that the
capabilities, characteristics, and uses of these devices have confounded the
justification for reduced Fourth Amendment standards upon which the T.L.O.
Court relied. First, the capabilities of cell phones and the uses to which
students put them demand the recognition of heightened privacy expectations
in these devices. Moreover, the complexity of cell phones increases the degree
†

This Comment received the 2011 Mary Laura “Chee” Davis Award for Writing Excellence.
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of intrusion students are forced to accept upon any search of their contents,
reaffirming the need for greater safeguards to respect students’ privacy
interests. Finally, school officials do not have a sufficient interest to justify
these extensive intrusions upon students’ heightened expectations of privacy
without more protective Fourth Amendment safeguards in place. In light of
these deficiencies, this Comment proposes a number of heightened measures,
including the reinstatement of probable cause and the requirement of parental
notice and consent, that may feasibly be implemented in the school
environment to better protect students’ privacy rights in a new frontier of the
Fourth Amendment’s application to public schools.
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INTRODUCTION
Writing in 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court could not have conceived of the
characteristics and capabilities of cellular phones when it diminished the
standard of Fourth Amendment protection public school students could expect
in their belongings. In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court abrogated the Fourth
Amendment’s typical requirement that a government official obtain a warrant
justified by probable cause before engaging in a search of an individual’s
person or belongings, holding instead that a public school official need only
“reasonable suspicion” to justify an intrusion into a student’s purse or
backpack.1 The Court’s reasoning, however, contemplates a bygone era that
predated the ubiquity of increasingly sophisticated cell phones in the school
environment.
The tremendous features and functions of these devices—and the personal
and extensive uses to which students put them—have arguably confounded the
balance T.L.O. struck between students’ privacy expectations and school
officials’ disciplinary needs. The emergence of the cell phone has accordingly
given rise to calls for heightened safeguards to protect students’ (and their
families’) Fourth Amendment rights in their phones against a T.L.O. standard
that may inadequately reflect these interests.2 Moreover, as students balk at the
low safeguards, school officials face legal uncertainty (and potential liability)
in a crucial, modern area of school authority.3 The need to clarify a heightened
standard is particularly pressing in light of public schools’ needs to respond to
a number of cell-phone-related issues, including the troubling modern
phenomenon of “cyberbullying,” an umbrella term encompassing a host of
methods by which students harm each other emotionally and relationally
through their cell phones and other electronic devices.4
1

469 U.S. 325, 339–45 (1985).
See, e.g., Katherine Leal Unmuth, Phone Search by High School Angers Parent, DALL. MORNING
NEWS, Aug. 2, 2010, at B1; Suzanne Ito, Pa. School District Pays $33,000 to Settle Cell Phone Search
Lawsuit, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS (Sept. 17, 2010, 3:34 PM), http://www.aclu.org/blog/free-speech/pa-schooldistrict-pays-33000-settle-cell-phone-search-lawsuit; Tara Parker-Pope, Should Schools Search Cellphones?,
N.Y. TIMES WELL BLOG (July 6, 2010, 10:25 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/06/should-schoolssearch-cellphones/; Jake Whittenberg, Schools’ Anti-Bullying Plan Includes Cell Phone Search, KING5.COM
(Aug. 23, 2010, 5:39 PM), http://www.king5.com/news/education/New-anti-bullying-plan-includes-cellphone-search-101313244.html.
3 See, e.g., Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 639–41 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (finding
that a school administrator’s search of a student’s cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment); Ito, supra note
2 (discussing a lawsuit brought on behalf of a student alleging a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights
after school administrators confiscated and searched her cell phone).
4 See discussion infra Part I.B.
2
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This Comment develops the argument that the distinctive characteristics of
students’ cell phones necessitate a reexamination of the standard, to this point
governed by T.L.O., guiding public school officials’ searches through the
contents of these devices.5 While courts and scholars have just begun to
explore the privacy implications of cell phones in other Fourth Amendment
contexts, the question has yet to be scrutinized under the T.L.O. framework and
in the public school context. In anticipation of the debate, this Comment
presents a case for students’ rights in an era when technology has strained the
established legal structure, arguing that students’ privacy expectations in their
cell phones demand greater protection than T.L.O. provides.
Part I of this Comment describes the prevalent use of cell phones among
students and in the public school environment, explains school officials’
corresponding need to search these devices’ contents, and provides a model
scenario to illustrate the problem. In Part II, this Comment surveys the legal
landscape governing school searches and notes a growing body of case law
expounding on the issue of cell phone searches by law enforcement authorities
in other areas of Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Part III advances the argument that the pervasiveness of cell phones upsets
the careful balance struck by the T.L.O. Court between students’ privacy
expectations and school officials’ interests, which the Court used to justify a
reduced standard of protection under the Fourth Amendment. A renewed
examination of students’ privacy interests in their cell phones demonstrates
that school officials should observe heightened safeguards before searching
these devices. Part IV of this Comment then suggests safeguards that could
feasibly be implemented in the public school environment.
I. THE PRESENCE AND PROBLEMS OF CELL PHONES IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
This Comment’s argument addresses a specific and increasingly common
situation facing school administrators: a search through the contents of a
student’s cell phone based on some degree of suspicion that the student has
violated school rules or criminal law. This Part first establishes the prevalence
of cell phones in public schools, then explains the problems associated with
5 This Comment’s scope is limited to public primary and secondary schools in the United States, and it
does not address searches by school officials in public institutions of higher education, such as colleges or
universities. For a discussion of students’ Fourth Amendment rights in public higher education, see generally 5
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.11(d), at 531–38
(4th ed. 2004).
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this phenomenon and the reasons school officials have for searching the
contents of these devices, and finally outlines a model situation facing teachers
and administrators.
A. The Uses and Ubiquity of Cell Phones in Schools
Without a doubt, students’ cell phones pervade the public school setting.
According to a 2010 study conducted by the Pew Internet & American Life
Project, 75% of American teenagers between the ages of twelve and seventeen
carry cell phones, a figure that increased from 45% in 2004.6 Inevitably, these
cell phones find their way inside school walls, regardless of schools’ attempts
to prohibit them.7 More than three-fourths of teenagers bring their cell phones
to school, despite that 86% of teenagers report that their schools have banned
the devices from classrooms during school hours.8 Moreover, students use their
cell phones frequently during the school day. Fully half of students reported
sending or receiving text messages during class at least several times per
week.9
As cell phones have become the norm in schools, their capabilities and
features have continued to evolve. Cell phones, as traditionally defined, are
small, mobile telephones capable of communicating with other phones via
conventional vocal interactions or text messages and often function as cameras
that can produce and store digital pictures or videos.10 The Internet provides
additional methods of communication. Internet users can send messages and
files to each other via electronic mail (known almost universally as e-mail);
can post messages, pictures, and videos on social networking sites such as
Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube;11 and can engage in instant-message
6 Amanda Lenhart et al., Teens and Mobile Phones, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT 2, 16 (Apr. 20,
2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media/Files/Reports/2010/PIP-Teens-and-Mobile-2010-with-topline.pdf.
7 For a discussion of school policies banning cell phones and the effects of these bans on students’
privacy rights, see infra Part III.A.3.
8 Lenhart et al., supra note 6, at 82.
9 Id. at 84. “Text messaging” allows cell phone users to communicate with one another by transmitting
short written messages, or text messages, between devices. Katharine M. O’Connor, Note, :o OMG They
Searched My Txts: Unraveling the Search and Seizure of Text Messages, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 685, 688.
10 SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, BULLYING BEYOND THE SCHOOLYARD: PREVENTING AND
RESPONDING TO CYBERBULLYING 8, 19 (2009).
11 This Comment does not address the information or material students place on the publicly accessible
areas of their social networking profiles. For example, personal Facebook websites include a “wall” onto
which text and photos can be placed for anyone visiting that particular site (typically a student’s
acquaintances) to read or view. See FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook (last visited Sept. 13,
2011). These public postings are quite different from text messages, e-mails, phone calls, or other forms of
more private communication available through cell phones, and these postings may not be protected by the
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conversations (allowing contemporaneous, text-based communication) through
a variety of websites.12 Until recently, these Internet-based forms of
communication and file sharing were accessible exclusively through personal
computers. The increasing sophistication of cell phone technology, however,
has allowed many—if not most—cell phones on the market to access the
Internet via high-speed connections and provide massive storage space for
high-quality pictures, videos, or music.13 These highly sophisticated cell
phones, often referred to as “smartphones,” constitute an enormous and everincreasing share of the cell phone market in the United States.14 Modern cell
phones, even so-called standard cell phones,15 have essentially allowed

Fourth Amendment at all. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”);
United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225–26 (D.P.R. 2002) (finding no expectation of privacy, a
prerequisite for Fourth Amendment protection, in information made widely available to others on the Internet),
vacated per curiam on other grounds, 90 F. App’x 3 (1st Cir. 2004). For a more detailed discussion of
individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights in their social networking websites, see generally David Hector Montes,
Note, Living Our Lives Online: The Privacy Implications of Social Networking, 5 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO.
SOC’Y 507 (2010).
12 See HINDUJA & PATCHIN, supra note 10, at 19; BARBARA C. TROLLEY & CONSTANCE HANEL, CYBER
KIDS, CYBER BULLYING, CYBER BALANCE 40 (2010).
13 Apple’s iPhone 4, HTC’s myTouch 4G Slide, and BlackBerry’s Torch models—all among the newest
models of smartphones available on the market as of September 2011—connect to the Internet using highspeed connections and store at least four gigabytes of information with an option to upgrade to thirty-two
gigabytes, a capacity easily encompassing thousands of text messages, photos, videos, music files, and other
applications or information. See BlackBerry Torch 9850 Specs & Torch 9860 Specs, BLACKBERRY,
http://us.blackberry.com/smartphones/blackberry-torch-9850-9860/#!phone-specifications (last visited Sept.
13, 2011); iPhone 4, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/iphone/features/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2011); T-Mobile
myTouch 4G Slide, HTC, http://www.htc.com/us/products/mytouch4gslide-tmobile?view=1-1&sort=0#techspecs (last visited Sept. 13, 2011).
14 In the third quarter of 2010, more than 20 million smartphones were sold in the United States. See
Nick Bilton, The Race to Dominate the Smartphone Market, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Nov. 1, 2010, 3:26 PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/01/apple-and-google-excel-in-u-s-smartphone-growth/. That number
was an increase from approximately 14.5 million in the previous quarter and 9.7 million in the second quarter
of 2009. See Matt Hamblen, OS War Has Android on Top in U.S. Smartphone Sales, COMPUTERWORLD (Aug.
12, 2010, 3:47 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9180624/OS_war_has_Android_on_top_in_
U.S._smartphone_sales. As of mid-2011, there were approximately 82 million smartphones in circulation in
the United States. Ellen Gibson, Mobile Shopping: More Buzz than Buy So Far, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 1,
2011, 3:56 AM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2016074590_apusmobileshopping
standstill.html.
15 Because smartphones and standard cell phones now possess many of the same functions and
capabilities, the Ohio Supreme Court (for example) has refused to draw an analytical distinction between them
in evaluating the privacy interests in cell phones generally. See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 954 (Ohio
2009) (noting that even standard cell phones can “store and transfer data and allow users to connect to the
Internet”). Similarly, this Comment will refer to cell phones as a collective category rather than distinguish
between smartphones and standard cell phones.
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students to carry to school “portable microcomputers” with all the salient
characteristics of a personal computer.16
It is these sophisticated devices that students are increasingly carrying with
them into schools. Studies have indicated that cell phone users, including
students, use their phones to communicate with others via the Internet, seek
online information, produce and store photographs or videos, shop, bank,
create documents, store medical records, or search for information regarding
personal or political interests.17 A large majority of students use their cell
phones to create and store images, and 54% use their phones to record and
store videos.18 Moreover, 31% of students use their cell phones for instant
messaging on the Internet, 21% access their e-mail accounts through their cell
phones, and nearly one-fourth use their cell phones to access their own and
others’ accounts on social networking sites.19
Cell phones with sophisticated characteristics and capabilities are prevalent
among students inside school walls. The pervasiveness of these devices,
however, has given rise to new concerns for teachers and administrators as
they seek to investigate disputes or accusations and maintain order in the
school environment.
B. The Rise of Content Searches by School Officials: Cyberbullying and Other
Harms
As cell phones have become a predominant mode of interaction between
students and have the capacity to store the evidence of so many aspects of a
student’s daily life, school officials often see the need to search the contents of
these devices in investigating accusations, suspicions, or disputes.20 One of the
primary social problems giving rise to the need to search a cell phone’s content
is the phenomenon of cyberbullying.21 In the public school context,
16 See Bryan Andrew Stillwagon, Note, Bringing an End to Warrantless Cell Phone Searches, 42 GA. L.
REV. 1165, 1171–72 (2008) (quoting Adriana de Souza e Silva, Interfaces of Hybrid Spaces, in THE CELL
PHONE READER 19, 19 (Anandam Kavoori & Noah Arceneaux eds., 2006)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
17 See Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical
Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1572–75 (2004)
(citing studies indicating the uses of Internet access through phones).
18 Lenhart et al., supra note 6, at 56.
19 Id.
20 See Marc Freeman, New Warnings on Technology Set in Schools, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale,
Fla.), Aug. 31, 2011, at 1B; Unmuth, supra note 2; Parker-Pope, supra note 2; Whittenberg, supra note 2.
21 See, e.g., Sharon Salyer, Mukilteo Schools May Check Students’ Cell Phones, HERALDNET (Jan. 24,
2011), http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20110124/NEWS01/701249945; Whittenberg, supra note 2.
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cyberbullying involves students “being cruel to others by sending or posting
harmful material or engaging in other forms of social cruelty using the Internet
or other digital technologies, such as cell phones.”22 Cyberbullying may take a
variety of forms. For example, cyberbullying may involve heated text-message
exchanges that lead to threats or physical violence.23 It may also take the form
of ongoing insults through posts, calls, e-mails, or text messages directed at a
single victim.24 Other instances of cyberbullying have involved impersonation,
where one student takes another’s cell phone and sends harmful messages or
images to others while acting as the cell phone’s owner.25 Cyberbullying may
even include “cyberstalking,” or often-anonymous onslaughts of
communications directed at someone through text messages, phone calls, or emails.26
One peculiar use of cell phones and other personal electronic devices
known as “sexting” deserves brief description as a frequent mechanism of
cyberbullying. Sexting refers to the “transmission of sexually charged
materials” (typically photos) between students through text messages or other
forms of file transmission,27 usually in the context of a romantic relationship.28
Sexting often becomes a vehicle for cyberbullying, as many students who
receive “sexts” eventually forward these photos or messages to other
unintended recipients out of either intrigue or spite, leading to wide
dissemination of extremely private material and the humiliation of the original
sender.29 These incidents are not isolated. Nineteen percent of teenagers have
sent a nude or seminude image to someone via text message or e-mail, and
22 NANCY E. WILLARD, CYBER-SAFE KIDS, CYBER-SAVVY TEENS 10 (2007). Notably, Willard’s 2007
conception of cyberbullying assumes Internet communications to be an alternative to cell phone
communications. The emergence of cell phones incorporating Internet access, however, has blurred the
distinction Willard makes, allowing students to access Internet communication options through their cell
phones. See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text.
23 See NANCY E. WILLARD, CYBERBULLYING AND CYBERTHREATS 5–6 (2007).
24 See id. at 6–7.
25 See id. at 8.
26 See id. at 10.
27 Dawn Zinga, Boundaries in Cyber-Space: Media and Stakeholders as Policy Shapers, in TRUTHS AND
MYTHS OF CYBER-BULLYING 105, 113 (Shaheen Shariff & Andrew H. Churchill eds., 2010).
28 See WILLARD, supra note 22, at 9–10.
29 See id. at 9. Cyberbullying involving this kind of material has led to tragedy in some cases. For
example, eighteen-year-old Jessica Logan, a public school student, took a nude photograph of herself using her
cell phone and sent the image to her then-boyfriend. Cindy Kranz, Family Wants Tougher Laws: Sexting
Suicide, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 22, 2009, at A1. Upon splitting up, the student who received the image
sent it to several other students, and eventually, the image had been sent to the cell phones of hundreds of
students at multiple schools in the area, leading to taunts and insults directed at Logan. Id. Humiliated, Logan
committed suicide. Id.
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31% have received such an image.30 Tellingly, 29% report that they have had a
sexted image shared with them knowing the material was intended to stay
between the sender and the original recipient.31
School administrators’ interests in searching the contents of students’ cell
phones commonly involve the use of these devices as instruments of
cyberbullying.32 The most frequent modes of cyberbullying—including phone
calls, text messages,33 instant-message conversations, e-mails, and social
networking websites34—can be and are perpetrated via cell phones, and thanks
to the increasing sophistication of cell phone technology, the evidence of
cyberbullying through these methods can typically (and even exclusively) be
accessed by searching these devices’ stored content or using the devices to
access the owners’ personal Internet data.35 In response to incidents of
cyberbullying, school officials often need to search the content accessible
through students’ cell phones.36

30 Sex and Tech: Results from a Survey of Teens and Young Adults, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT TEEN
& UNPLANNED PREGNANCY 11, http://www.thenationalcampaign.org/sextech/PDF/SexTech_Summary.pdf
(last visited Sept. 13, 2011). These figures are even greater in the context of sexually suggestive messages,
such as instant messages or text messages; 38% of students reported sending such messages, and nearly half
(48%) reported having received such messages. Id.
31 Id. Again, the figure is higher in the context of sexually suggestive messages, as 39% reported
receiving such messages despite knowing the message had originally been private. Id.
32 See sources cited supra note 21.
33 See Amanda Lenhart, Cyberbullying 2010: What the Research Tells Us, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE
PROJECT (May 6, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/Presentations/2010/May/Cyberbullying-2010.aspx.
34 See MARCI FELDMAN HERTZ & CORINNE DAVID-FERDON, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND YOUTH VIOLENCE 7 (2008), available at http://www.cdc.gov/
violenceprevention/pdf/EA-brief-a.pdf.
35 This Comment does not address the question of whether third parties, including recipients of messages
or e-mails, can reveal this information to school officials against the sender’s wishes; this Comment confronts
only the question of whether a school official can search the cell phone of the sender. The Fourth Amendment
likely provides no protection when the recipient of a communication reveals its content. See United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed
on the assumption that . . . the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”).
36 A recent anecdote illustrates the point. In early 2010, two Florida students engaged in a heated textmessage exchange that led to a violent physical altercation. See Laura C. Morel, Beaten Deerfield Beach Teen
Josie Lou Ratley Recovering at Home, MIAMI HERALD, June 2, 2010, at B3. The evidence of the students’
exchange was exclusively accessible by reviewing the stored messages on each student’s cell phone. See id.
The need is particularly acute and sensitive in the context of sexting, where students use their cell phones to
produce, store, and send extremely private communications or photos, thereby requiring a review of the cell
phone’s contents in the course of any investigation into the conduct, which often constitutes a violation of
school rules. See, e.g., Scott Burton, Kelso School District Bans Sexting, KGW.COM (Feb. 8, 2011, 6:06 PM),
http://www.kgw.com/news/local/Kelso-School-District-Bans-Sexting-115539049.html.
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Many school districts have proposed controversial policies regarding cell
phone searches that reflect this need to investigate cyberbullying incidents,
emphasizing the timely importance of the question this Comment addresses.
Before the 2010–2011 school year, for example, a Washington school district
proposed a policy allowing school principals to search cell phone contents
“when they suspect students may be using their phones to harass others via email, text message or by sending photos,” activities that constitute violations of
school rules.37 Similarly, a Florida school district adopted new 2011–2012
handbook language holding students “responsible for any inappropriate,
immoral, unethical, dangerous, destructive, hateful or threatening behavior”
committed through “a technological device.”38
Of course, the need to investigate cyberbullying does not exhaust the list of
reasons school officials have for searching students’ cell phones. Cell phones
may be involved in the violation of any number of school rules or policies,
including theft of the cell phone itself, use of the cell phone to call or text other
students when such activity is prohibited (during class, for example), or use of
the cell phone’s communication or photo functions to help others cheat on
examinations.39 Moreover, the text messages, stored photos, or other stored
files on or accessible from cell phones could constitute evidence of darker
social ills like drug possession, use, or dealing.40
As this Comment will explore, school officials’ searches of cell phones will
inevitably give rise to Fourth Amendment concerns due to the personal (and
often extremely private) nature of the contents of the cell phone that is the
subject of the search, and the resultant controversy has produced uncertainty as
students worry about their privacy and school officials fret over argumentative
parents and potential lawsuits. The following section explores a model case to
illustrate the scenario commonly facing schools and provide a basis for
analyzing the Fourth Amendment issues involved.

37

Whittenberg, supra note 2.
Freeman, supra note 20 (quoting SCH. DIST. OF PALM BEACH CNTY., FLA., STUDENT & FAMILY
HANDBOOK 2011–2012, at 51 (2011), available at http://www.palmbeachschools.org/Students/handbook/
documents/2011-2012_Student_Handbook_Final_English_to_PRINT.pdf) (internal quotation mark omitted).
39 See Bernard James, Legal Update: Safe Schools, Cell Phones, and the Fourth Amendment,
PEPPERDINE U. SCH. L. (2009), http://law.pepperdine.edu/academics/faculty/publications/James-NASROCell
PhoneLaw.pdf.
40 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia-Aleman, No. 1:10-CR-29, 2010 WL 2635071, at *12 (E.D. Tex. June
9, 2010) (recognizing cell phones as “tools of the drug trade”).
38
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C. A Model Scenario41
Chris Pupil, a junior at City High School, carries a cell phone with him
(and often uses it) during school hours despite a City School District policy
that prohibits cell phones. Pupil can use his cell phone, an iPhone 4, to call or
text message his friends and acquaintances, as well as browse the Internet and
check his e-mail account, hold instant-message conversations with others, and
access his message inbox on Facebook.42 The iPhone also takes high-resolution
photos and stores thousands of songs and videos.43
Over the past month, Pupil and several friends have been playing pranks on
another student in the school, John Student, by creating identical degrading
text messages on each person’s cell phone and then sending them all at once
during lunch hour. The clog of incoming text messages jams Student’s phone,
and the device’s screen often remains frozen on whatever message Pupil and
his friends decided to send that day unless Student removes his phone’s battery
and reboots the device. Pupil and his friends have also found it humorous to
surreptitiously take embarrassing photos of Student during the school day and
then text them to Student days or weeks later. Though Student, a shy teenager
with few friends, originally played along, the pranks are beginning to bother
him. Student tells a friend about the situation. The friend suggests telling a
faculty member at City High, but Student refuses to involve authorities. The
friend takes matters into his own hands and tells Margaret Principal, City
High’s assistant principal, that Student is being cyberbullied by students in the
school, including Pupil.
41 This model scenario draws from several cases and situations involving school officials’ searches of
students’ cell phones. See, e.g., Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 627 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(describing a search by a school official of a cell phone confiscated without any suspicion); Richard Hartsock,
Note, Sext Ed.: Students’ Fourth Amendment Rights in a Technological Age, 37 N. KY. L. REV. 191, 204–07
(2010) (analyzing a similar scenario to the model case presented here, but emphasizing sexting); Unmuth,
supra note 2 (detailing a school official’s search of a student’s cell phone in response to a dispute involving
electronic communication); Ito, supra note 2 (describing the confiscation and search of a cell phone); ParkerPope, supra note 2 (presenting psychologist Elizabeth Englander’s similar hypothetical involving a cell phone
search in the context of a cyberbullying investigation); Whittenberg, supra note 2 (explaining a school policy
allowing principals to search students’ cell phones based on a suspicion that the student has engaged in
cyberbullying against another student in violation of school rules). The model presented here customizes the
situation for analytical clarity throughout this Comment.
42 The “message” function of Facebook mirrors e-mail in that it allows private messages to be sent
between one Facebook user and another, see The New Messages, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/about/
messages/?setup (last visited Sept. 13, 2011), as opposed to the more public “wall” function, which allows
everyone who visits a particular personal website to see the message shared between the two users, see supra
note 11.
43 See iPhone 4, supra note 13.
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Principal begins her investigation of this alleged cyberbullying, which is
specifically prohibited in school antibullying policies, by calling Pupil into her
office, informing him of the allegations, and asking for his cell phone. Pupil
denies the accusation and refuses to give Principal his phone, but he hands it
over when Principal threatens to give him in-school suspension. Principal
dismisses Pupil but keeps the cell phone in her possession. Principal, a
technological neophyte, proceeds to examine the contents of the cell phone.
She first turns it on, then after several clicks through many of the phone’s
applications (happening upon several stored photos and notes), finally
stumbles upon the text-message inbox. She scrolls through several hundred of
the messages, finding some that were directed toward Student. In the process,
she comes across a number of other messages, including one from Pupil’s
father telling him private information regarding a family member, one from his
mother saying that the family did not have enough money to send him on a
spring-break trip with his friends, and one from Pupil’s girlfriend regarding an
issue in their relationship. Hoping to find stored e-mails of Pupil’s
cyberbullying activities directed at Student, Principal then accesses the Internet
through his cell phone and enters his e-mail account (which Pupil’s cell phone
automatically remains logged into). Principal finds no stored e-mails to Student
but runs across an e-mail thread between Pupil and a friend making several
disparaging remarks about faculty members at the school, including Principal
herself.
Later that day, Principal calls Pupil back into her office, returns the phone
to him, and serves him a three-day in-school suspension based on the evidence
found on his phone for violating City High’s antibullying policy. Principal also
tells him she is personally offended by the remarks he made about her through
e-mail and is reconsidering her earlier intention to recommend Pupil for
several college scholarships.
With the help of his parents, Pupil commences a lawsuit against Principal
and City School District, alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to
be free from unreasonable searches and claiming monetary damages.
Though this scenario may be somewhat extreme, versions of it happen
often in public schools around the country,44 fueling increasingly frequent calls
for a reexamination of the Fourth Amendment protections allowed to students,

44

See supra note 41.
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at least in their cell phones.45 To understand the problems with these
protections, the next Part will review the current Fourth Amendment landscape
for public schools and note the problems in applying established Fourth
Amendment doctrine to cell phones.
II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE AND A NEW FRONTIER FOR THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT IN SCHOOLS
In constructing the Fourth Amendment, the Founders had a central purpose
in mind: to require law enforcement authorities to state specifically what they
intended to seize or search and have sufficient evidence to justify the
intrusion.46 While the concept of unjust invasions by state authorities had
crystallized into the general words “unreasonable searches and seizures” in
some early state constitutions,47 the Founders found the searches of a few
specific places and objects particularly objectionable.48 Thus, while the
finalized Fourth Amendment incorporated the broad “unreasonable” language,
it clarified the places and objects the Founders had in mind:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
49
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Until the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court accordingly limited its
Fourth Amendment analysis to these four enumerations and refused to
recognize protection in items that did not fall squarely into those categories.50
45 See, e.g., School Administrators Violate Colorado Law, Constitutional Rights by Searching Students’
Text Messages, ACLU OF COLO. (Oct. 10, 2007), http://aclu-co.org/news/school-administrators-violatecolorado-law-constitutional-rights-by-searching-students-text-mes.
46 See generally WILLIAM J. CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING
602–1791, at 602–13 (2009) (discussing early state delegations’ debates and decisions that influenced the
language of the Fourth Amendment).
47 E.g., id. at 605–06 (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XIV) (internal quotation marks omitted).
48 See id. at 607, 687–88, 691–97.
49 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphases added).
50 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463–66 (1928) (finding no Fourth Amendment
protection in the phone wires outside an individual’s house because the wire did not qualify as any of the
enumerated categories listed in the Fourth Amendment), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967). To be fair, it should be noted that the Court insinuated in several early cases that the Fourth
Amendment could protect interests beyond a narrow definition of the expressed categories. See, e.g., Gouled v.
United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921) (observing that the Fourth Amendment “should receive a liberal
construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon . . . the rights secured” therein); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) (arguing that the language of the Fourth Amendment “should be liberally
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After prolonged wrestling with issues related to telephone-based
communication, however, the Court in Katz v. United States finally determined
that the spirit of the Fourth Amendment extended beyond these antiquated
classifications and protected any object in which an individual expects a
certain degree of privacy.51 This concept, known since as the “reasonable
expectation of privacy,”52 protects objects or places in which an individual has
a subjective belief in her personal privacy that society is “prepared to
recognize as legitimate.”53
As case law since Katz has clarified, the Fourth Amendment’s constraints
are implicated only when government authorities conduct searches54 involving
places in which the individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.55 If
such an expectation exists in the particular object searched, the question
becomes whether the government official conducted the search in an
unreasonable manner.56 In a typical case, if a particular search is found to
implicate the Fourth Amendment, officials must demonstrate the
reasonableness (and thus constitutionality) of the invasion by showing that
they obtained, from a magistrate judge, a warrant that was supported by

construed”). As the Olmstead Court asserted, however, these recommendations could not “justify enlargement
of the language employed beyond the possible practical meaning of houses, persons, papers, and effects.” 277
U.S. at 465.
51 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. . . . [W]hat [a
person] seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”).
52 The phrase “reasonable expectation of privacy” was actually coined by Justice Harlan in his Katz
concurring opinion, see id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring), and was officially adopted to describe the concept
in later cases, see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (noting that the Fourth Amendment inquiry
“normally embraces” Justice Harlan’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy analysis from Katz).
53 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984).
54 This Comment addresses searches, which are analytically distinct from seizures. See generally 1 JOHN
WESLEY HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 1.7–.15, at 15–31 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the different analyses for
searches and seizures). As John Wesley Hall clarifies, “[s]earches and seizures are separate constitutional
events” because while searches implicate a person’s privacy interests, seizures affect only possessory interests.
Id. § 1.7, at 15.
55 See, e.g., Hudson, 468 U.S. at 530 (holding the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to a particular search
because the subject of the search had no expectation of privacy in the given situation); see also Donald L.
Beci, School Violence: Protecting Our Children and the Fourth Amendment, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 817, 825
(1992) (“It is clear that the Fourth Amendment does not apply unless one has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in what is being searched.”); Stillwagon, supra note 16, at 1185–86 (“It is important to remember that
before reaching the issue of applicable exceptions to the warrant requirement, a court may find a search valid if
there was not a reasonable expectation of privacy in the object, thus eliminating the initial need for a warrant
altogether.”).
56 THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION § 1.2.1.2, at 8–9
(2008).
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probable cause that the search would turn up evidence of a crime.57 If they
cannot make this required showing, the individual may vindicate her rights by
suppressing the illegally obtained evidence58 and claiming monetary damages
for the violation of her Fourth Amendment protections.59 The latter remedy is
“[c]hief among” those available to public school students alleging such
violations.60
At times, however, the Supreme Court has found that the reasonableness
command of the Fourth Amendment61 permits particularly defined exceptions
to the warrant requirement, thus allowing government officials under certain
circumstances to search protected interests without a warrant—and sometimes
without probable cause.62 For example, the Court has recognized that a law
enforcement officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment by conducting a
warrantless search of an automobile if she has probable cause to search it and
if obtaining a warrant would be impracticable due to the vehicle’s ability to
move quickly away from the scene.63 As the next section will explain, the
Court found that searches of students and their belongings by public school
officials also constitute an exception to the typical Fourth Amendment
safeguards.

57 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (stating that warrantless searches are
presumptively unreasonable). Probable cause to justify a search “exists where ‘the facts and circumstances
within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is
being committed and that evidence bearing on that offense will be found in the place to be searched.” Safford
Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009) (citation omitted) (quoting Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (alterations in original)).
58 In most cases, if a court finds that an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the
evidence procured as a result of this violation becomes inadmissible at a criminal proceeding. See, e.g., United
States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470 (1980) (excluding “any ‘fruits’ of a constitutional violation—whether such
evidence be tangible, physical material actually seized in an illegal search, [or] items observed or words
overheard in the course of the unlawful activity” (footnote omitted)); see also CLANCY, supra note 56, § 1.2.3,
at 13.
59 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, defendants may recover monetary damages from or request injunctions
against government entities that violated their Fourth Amendment rights. See CLANCY, supra note 56, § 13.8,
at 654.
60 Beci, supra note 55, at 826; accord LAWRENCE F. ROSSOW & JACQUELINE A. STEFKOVICH, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 53 (3d ed. 2006). Indeed, many Fourth Amendment cases involving
public school officials have been founded upon § 1983 claims. See, e.g., Redding, 129 S. Ct. at 2633.
61 The Court has acknowledged that “[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (emphasis added).
62 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (observing that the presumptive rule on
warrantless searches is subject to “specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”).
63 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
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A. New Jersey v. T.L.O.: A Balancing Act and a Standard for Public Schools
The Fourth Amendment analysis of any search of students’ belongings by
school officials begins with the Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in New Jersey
v. T.L.O.64
The T.L.O. Court considered the case of a high school student who claimed
that her Fourth Amendment rights had been violated when her school’s
assistant vice principal, Theodore Choplick, searched her purse. A faculty
member had spotted the student smoking a cigarette in a school bathroom in
violation of school rules and reported the student to Choplick.65 The student
denied smoking in the bathroom, so Choplick asked to see the student’s
purse.66 Inside the purse, Choplick found cigarettes, and upon removing them,
he noticed a stack of “rolling papers” that he believed to be associated with
marijuana use.67 Based on this finding, he searched further and found
marijuana, a pipe, several dollar bills, an index card with a list of individuals
who owed the student money, and two other notes that implicated her in
dealing marijuana.68 Choplick notified the student’s mother and turned the
evidence over to police.69 Before a New Jersey juvenile court, the student
moved to exclude the evidence found in her purse because Choplick’s
actions—first searching the purse itself for cigarettes, and then conducting a
second search of the purse and its pockets for evidence of marijuana
possession—violated her Fourth Amendment rights.70 The court denied the
motion and found her delinquent.71 The student appealed the ruling in New
Jersey state courts, and the New Jersey Supreme Court eventually held
Choplick’s search unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment because
it had been initiated without sufficient suspicion that a search of the student’s
purse would turn up evidence of wrongdoing.72

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Id. at 328.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 329.
Id. at 329–30.
Id. at 330–31.
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The U.S. Supreme Court reversed and deemed Choplick’s search
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.73 In doing so, the Court carved an
exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement that still guides
school officials’ searches of students’ belongings.74
The reasonableness command of the Fourth Amendment is crucial to the
reasoning of Justice White’s opinion for the majority. As White stated initially,
the legality of any search depends “on the reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search.”75 Using a well-established balancing test
typically employed to illuminate the opposing interests at stake,76 White
evaluated students’ expectations of privacy in their belongings against school
officials’ interests in searching through these belongings. On one hand,
students retained “legitimate expectations of privacy” in their belongings at
school,77 though as Justice White suggested and as his fellow justices in the
majority made explicit, students’ privacy expectations were far lower than
those of the general population, at least during the school day.78 On the other
hand, Justice White acknowledged that school officials needed the relatively
unencumbered ability to maintain “discipline in the classroom and on school
grounds” in the unique environment of schools,79 expressing particular concern
for “drug use and violent crime” among students.80
With this balance between competing interests in mind, the Court decided
that the Fourth Amendment allowed not only the elimination of the warrant
requirement but also an abrogation of the typical probable cause requirement.81
The warrant, Justice White reasoned, was “unsuited to the school
environment” because “requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching
a child suspected of an infraction of school rules . . . would unduly interfere
with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed
in the schools.”82 Furthermore, the relaxed privacy expectations of students
73 Id. at 333. The Court quickly dispensed with a threshold question in deciding that public school
officials, although agents of state governments rather than the federal government, were still subject to the
strictures of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 333–34.
74 See Jon M. Van Dyke, The Privacy Rights of Public School Students, 32 U. HAW. L. REV. 305, 305–06
(2010) (noting the continuing application of the T.L.O. approach).
75 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 337 (citing Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536–37 (1967)).
77 Id. at 338–39.
78 Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring).
79 Id. at 339 (majority opinion).
80 Id.
81 Id. at 340–41.
82 Id. at 340.
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and the pressures of the school setting demanded a reduction in the level of
individualized suspicion (normally probable cause) needed to justify a
search.83
These typical requirements annulled, White established a two-pronged test
for evaluating the reasonableness of school officials’ searches of students’
belongings.84 First, a school official’s search must be “justified at its
inception,” meaning that the school official needs “reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence” of a violation of school rules
or of criminal activity.85 Second, the search must be “reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference.”86 As White
emphasized, the ultimate consideration here is whether “the measures adopted”
by the school official to execute the search are “not excessively intrusive in
light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”87
White applied this standard of reduced Fourth Amendment protections to
uphold the reasonableness of Choplick’s search. Because the student denied
the offense for which she was accused, the presence of cigarettes in her purse
would support the contrary eyewitness report of a faculty member; therefore,
Choplick’s search was justified at its inception because he reasonably believed
the search would turn up evidence of a violation of school rules.88 White then
found that Choplick’s second search of the purse for marijuana paraphernalia
did not extend beyond a reasonable scope.89 The discovery of rolling papers
upon removing the cigarettes gave rise to the suspicion of a new, more serious
infraction—possession of an illegal substance—and a complete search of the
student’s purse, including the purse’s interior pockets, was therefore justified.90
B. The Balancing Act Continued
By 2002, the Supreme Court had twice recognized and confirmed students’
lowered expectations of privacy in addressing the constitutionality of drugtesting programs conducted in public schools. In Vernonia School District 47J
v. Acton, the Court upheld mandatory urinalysis testing of student athletes in
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

See id. at 340–41.
See id. at 341–43.
Id. at 341–42.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 345–46.
Id. at 347.
Id.
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part because, per T.L.O., students—and student athletes in particular—retained
lower privacy expectations than adults.91 The Court similarly approved of
another drug-testing scheme in Board of Education v. Earls, where school
officials tested all students who participated in school-sponsored
extracurricular activities.92 While searches consisting of drug-testing
programs93 are factually distinct and call for a separate line of analysis,94 Acton
and Earls merit mention both for their recognition of students’ reduced
expectations of privacy95 and for an additional factor the two cases consider:
the degree of intrusion. In each case, the students were subjected to only
“negligible”96 or “minimal[]”97 intrusions upon their already truncated privacy
91 515 U.S. 646, 654–57 (1995) (recognizing students’, and particularly student athletes’, reduced
privacy expectations as the first of three factors for determining the constitutionality of a drug-testing scheme).
92 536 U.S. 822, 830–32 (2002) (recognizing the diminished privacy expectations of any student that
participates in extracurricular activities as the first of three factors in analyzing the drug-testing program).
93 Any governmental action that invades an individual’s legitimate privacy expectations constitutes a
“search” implicating Fourth Amendment protection, even if the particular invasion is not a search in the
conventional sense. See CLANCY, supra note 56, § 1.2.1.1.1, at 4–5.
94 Indeed, the Court has formed a distinct cache of cases challenging programmatic intrusions upon
privacy interests conducted without any individualized suspicion whatsoever. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S.
419 (2004) (traffic checkpoint); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (drug-testing program);
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (traffic checkpoint); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444 (1990) (traffic checkpoint); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)
(drug-testing program). Examples of these suspicionless searches are mandatory drug-testing programs like
those promulgated by school officials in Acton and Earls. Notably, the suspicionless-search analysis—which
considers the nature of the privacy interest, the degree of the challenged intrusion, and the character of the
governmental need and the program’s effectiveness in meeting it, see Acton, 515 U.S. at 654, 658, 660—
stems, in large part, from the fringes of T.L.O. In particular, a footnote from the T.L.O. majority opinion
recognizing that “the Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of [individualized] suspicion,”
469 U.S. at 342 n.8 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)) (internal quotation
mark omitted), has provided fodder for cases justifying suspicionless searches in particular situations, see, e.g.,
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665 (recognizing the “longstanding principle” that individualized suspicion is not “an
indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance” (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8)).
Similarly, Justice Blackmun’s statement that reduced safeguards may be substituted for the warrant and
probable cause requirement when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable,” T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment), has been repeated by cases eliminating the warrant and probable cause requirement entirely,
see, e.g., Earls, 536 U.S. at 829 (citing the “special needs” language to engage in a balancing inquiry and
ultimately justify a drug-testing program conducted without a warrant or any individualized suspicion).
95 Importantly, neither Acton nor Earls goes as far to say that students’ expectations of privacy in general
have been reduced from the level recognized in T.L.O. In fact, Justice Thomas, writing for the Earls majority,
may not have been in the majority had he attempted to fully generalize the reduced expectation of privacy he
attributed to students participating in extracurricular activities. Justice Breyer, who commanded the “critical
fifth vote” in Earls, LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11(c), at 529, emphasized in concurrence that he joined the
majority and upheld the drug-testing program only because it “avoids subjecting the entire school to testing,”
Earls, 536 U.S. at 841 (Breyer, J., concurring).
96 Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.
97 Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
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expectations, and this determination played into each case’s ultimate holding.
Though the “degree of intrusion” factor is somewhat specific to the drugtesting analysis,98 the slight infringements in Acton and Earls present an
intriguing juxtaposition with the intrusion in the Court’s most recent schoolsearch case, Safford Unified School District # 1 v. Redding.99
In many respects, Redding involved a similar scenario to Choplick’s search
in T.L.O. An eighth-grade student was called into the office of the school’s
assistant principal, Kerry Wilson, after Wilson had received a report that the
student was involved in the distribution of pills to other students in the
school.100 The student denied any involvement in the alleged activity.101
Wilson proceeded to search her backpack and outer clothing, and upon finding
no evidence of any illegal substance, Wilson directed her to the nurse’s office
for a further search.102 In the nurse’s office, the student was instructed to
remove all her clothing except for her underwear, which again turned up no
evidence of the suspected activity.103 The student described the search to her
mother, who then sued the school district for a violation of the student’s Fourth
Amendment rights.104
In rejecting the reasonableness of Wilson’s search in Redding, the Supreme
Court engaged in a fairly straightforward application of the two-pronged test
set out in T.L.O.105 The Court first found that the search was justified at its
inception due to the various indications giving rise to reasonable suspicion of
the allegation that the student possessed drugs.106 The Court rejected the
search, however, on the grounds that the search did not remain within a
reasonable scope based on the objective of the search, violating the second
T.L.O. prong.107 Essentially, due to the relatively weak power of the drugs
Wilson believed she would find and the lack of any reason to believe the drugs
were in the student’s undergarments, the school’s interest in searching the

98 See Acton, 515 U.S. at 658 (observing that the “character of the intrusion” is the second factor in the
analysis of a drug-testing program’s constitutionality).
99 129 S. Ct. 2633 (2009).
100 Id. at 2638.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. Redding was also asked to pull out her bra and underwear, revealing her breasts and pelvic area to
some extent. Id.
104 Id.
105 See id. at 2640–43.
106 See id. at 2641.
107 See id. at 2642.
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student did not justify the intensely private nature of the intrusion.108 True to
T.L.O., the Court once again measured the student’s privacy expectations and
the degree of intrusion against the government interest at stake. This time,
however, the Court found the government’s interest wanting.
Justice White’s balancing inquiry pitting the student’s particular
expectation of privacy against a school administrator’s interest in maintaining
school order (or, as each of the cases in this section entail, in investigating drug
possession or use) has carried through recent cases. The T.L.O. two-pronged
test based on this balancing analysis still governs any suspicion-based school
search109—including an administrator’s search through a student’s cell
phone.110
C. The Puzzling Question of Cell Phones and the Fourth Amendment
Before analyzing the problems with the reduced T.L.O. standard in light of
the emergence of cell phones in public schools, it should be recognized that the
debate over the proper approach to these devices has begun in various other
areas of Fourth Amendment doctrine in the past few years. While several
courts have grappled with the question of how the Fourth Amendment should
treat cell phones, the law is far from settled. This section briefly reviews the
ways courts have analyzed cell phones in other Fourth Amendment contexts.
As a starting point, it is clear that individuals enjoy a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their cell phones, and thus a search of those cell
phones implicates Fourth Amendment concerns and requires a warrant based
upon probable cause—unless, of course, one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement applies.111 The question has become, however, whether cell
108 See id. at 2642–43 (noting that “the content of the suspicion failed to match the degree of intrusion”
because the suspected facts provided no “indication of danger to the students from the power of the drugs or
their quantity, [or] any reason to suppose that [the student] was carrying pills in her underwear”).
109 Van Dyke, supra note 74, at 305–06.
110 See, e.g., Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 640–41 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (analyzing
a cell phone search by a school official under the T.L.O. two-prong test).
111 See United States v. Cole, No. 1:09-CR-0412-ODE-RGV, 2010 WL 3210963, at *16 (N.D. Ga. Aug.
11, 2010) (“Courts have recognized that individuals retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
information stored in their cell phones . . . .” (citing United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259 (5th Cir.
2007))); see also United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007) (“A personal computer is often a
repository for private information the computer’s owner does not intend to share with others. ‘[F]or most
people, their computers are their most private spaces.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1077 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting))); United States v.
Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in information
stored on a personal computer).
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phones (or similar devices, such as laptop computers) may be searched without
full Fourth Amendment protections if an exception does apply.112
Thus far, many courts have come down against demanding higher
safeguards for searches of cell phones and similar devices. In United States v.
Arnold, for example, the Ninth Circuit rejected a defendant’s argument that his
laptop computer was entitled to greater protection than the border exception to
the warrant requirement provided.113 Similarly, in United States v. Murphy, the
Fourth Circuit disregarded the argument that cell phone searches require a
warrant due to their increased storage capacity under the search-incident-toarrest exception,114 in part because it would be too troublesome for officers at
the scene to discern the difference between cell phones with large storage
capacities and those with smaller capacities.115 A litany of lower courts have
fallen in line.116

112 See, e.g., United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1087–90 (10th Cir.) (discussing, without deciding,
whether hard drives and a laptop could be searched and seized pursuant to the “automobile exception”), cert.
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1028 (2009); Finley, 477 F.3d at 259–60 (finding that an exception for searches incident to
lawful arrests permitted an officer’s search of a cell phone’s contents).
113 533 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008). Border searches are generally justified as a matter of what is
essentially homeland security. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004) (reasoning that
“[i]t is axiomatic that the United States, as sovereign, has the inherent authority to protect, and a paramount
interest in protecting, its territorial integrity,” which justifies privacy intrusions without the typical safeguards
at the border); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (“[S]earches made at the border . . . are
reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border . . . .”). In Arnold, the Ninth Circuit noted
the sovereignty justification for border searches and specifically rejected the idea that a laptop, due to its large
storage capacity, fell into the border exception’s “particularly offensive” search category, which would have
caused the search to be unreasonable. 533 F.3d at 1010.
114 552 F.3d 405, 411 (4th Cir. 2009); accord Finley, 477 F.3d at 259–60 (categorizing cell phones as
containers searchable without a warrant when found on an individual’s person pursuant to a lawful arrest based
upon probable cause); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 507–09 (Cal. 2011) (refusing to recognize the argument
that cell phones have tremendously large storage capacities and would be, therefore, categorically distinct from
tangible containers in the search-incident-to-arrest context). The exception for searches incident to arrest
upholds the reasonableness of searches of an individual’s person and immediate surroundings without a
warrant, as long as the individual has been detained upon probable cause. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 762–63 (1969). This doctrine is based primarily on the need for officers to both preserve evidence and
prevent harm to themselves by securing any weapons the arrestee might possess. See United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
115 Murphy, 552 F.3d at 411.
116 See, e.g., United States v. Stringer, No. 10-05038-01-CR-SW-GAF, 2011 WL 3847026, at *8 (W.D.
Mo. July 20, 2011) (concluding that cell phones may be searched without higher safeguards than those
provided by the search-incident-to-arrest exception); United States v. Garcia-Aleman, No. 1:10-CR-29, 2010
WL 2635071, at *12 (E.D. Tex. June 9, 2010) (“Recently, several district courts have held that officers may
search the contents of a cell phone (just as it allows searches of closed containers) seized during a traffic stop
as long as there is probable cause to believe the phone contained evidence of a crime.”); United States v.
Valdez, No. 06-CR-336, 2008 WL 360548, at *2–4 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 8, 2008) (finding cell phones searchable
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Some courts have determined, however, that cell phones are categorically
and analytically distinct from the tangible objects envisioned by the cases that
originally established the traditional Fourth Amendment exceptions. The Tenth
Circuit, for example, reflected in dicta that “laptop computers, hard drives,
flash drives or even cell phones” could very well deserve “preferred status”
under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement due to their “unique
ability to hold vast amounts of diverse personal information.”117 Likewise, the
Ohio Supreme Court held the search of a lawfully arrested individual’s cell
phone unreasonable due to the unique characteristics of the devices.118 Other
courts have similarly upheld the analytically distinct nature of cell phones in
various Fourth Amendment contexts.119
While the young debate over the privacy implications of cell phones is
worth recognizing, these cases provide only limited guidance in the public
school context, as many courts have made clear to limit their analysis to the
particularities of the exception in question.120 Though the issue is pressing,
courts have not yet considered the validity of cell phone searches under the
framework of the T.L.O. exception for public schools, the subject to which this
Comment now turns.
III. QUESTIONING THE T.L.O. EXCEPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF CELL PHONES
The ultimate effect of T.L.O. has been to except school officials from the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirement. As described
above, Justice White based this exception, and the two-pronged standard that
without a warrant under the search-incident-to-arrest exception); United States v. Curry, No. 07-100-P-H, 2008
WL 219966, at *10 (D. Me. Jan. 23, 2008) (same).
117 Burgess, 576 F.3d at 1090 (dictum). The Supreme Court has held that if a law enforcement officer has
probable cause to search an automobile, she does not violate the Fourth Amendment by conducting a
warrantless search of that automobile due to the vehicle’s ability to move away from the scene. See United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (“If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle,
it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.”).
118 See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 952–55 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010).
119 See, e.g., United States v. Park, No. CR 05-375 SI, 2007 WL 1521573, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. May 23,
2007) (holding that cell phones provide a higher expectation of privacy than afforded under the searchincident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement due to the vast amounts of private information capable
of being stored on them).
120 See United States v. Cole, No. 1:09-CR-0412-ODE-RGV, 2010 WL 3210963, at *17 n.24 (N.D. Ga.
Aug. 11, 2010) (distinguishing cases that considered cell phone searches under the inventory and incident-toarrest exceptions to the warrant requirement because they were “not relevant . . . to the Court’s analysis of the
independent automobile exception to the warrant requirement”); see also United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d
1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008); Garcia-Aleman, 2010 WL 2635071, at *10 (analyzing cell phone searches under
the search-incident-to-arrest exception); People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 506–07 (Cal. 2011) (same).
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replaced the normal requirement, on a balancing act weighing students’
reduced expectations of privacy in their belongings at school against school
officials’ needs to quell significant disruptions in a unique environment.121
The T.L.O. standard equally applies to cell phone searches in public
schools and would almost inevitably uphold a routine, suspicion-based search.
Recall the scenario outlined in Part I.C, in which Chris Pupil sued City School
District and Margaret Principal, the assistant principal at City High School, for
violating his Fourth Amendment rights by searching the contents of his cell
phone. The apparent outcome of Pupil v. City School District serves as an
illustrative starting point for understanding the problems with the application
of the T.L.O. standard to cell phones.
A court hearing the case would dutifully apply the two-step analysis
outlined in T.L.O. for analyzing searches of students’ belongings by school
officials.122 Thus, the court would first consider whether Principal’s search of
the phone was justified at its inception. In this case, Principal had heard a
report from a reliable third party, a friend of John Student, that Pupil had acted
in ways that violated school antibullying policies. Principal almost certainly
had reasonable suspicion that a search of Pupil’s phone would turn up evidence
of this violation. Accordingly, it is difficult to argue that Principal’s search was
not justified from the beginning.123
As for the reasonable-scope requirement, it is somewhat unclear how a
court would find.124 It is easy to imagine, however, that a court in Pupil’s case
would uphold the reasonableness of the search’s scope, despite that it involved
reading several private text messages and e-mails stored on or accessible
through the cell phone, as well as coming across some photos and notes. The
T.L.O. Court upheld the search of a student’s purse, including an examination
of the purse’s interior compartments and of a notecard and two notes found
inside them, as within a reasonable scope because the places searched were
broadly related to the objective of the search.125 Under this directive, it would

121

See discussion supra Part II.A.
See, e.g., Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 640–41 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (applying
the T.L.O. two-part test in determining whether a school official unconstitutionally searched through the
contents of a student’s cell phone).
123 Cf. Hartsock, supra note 41, at 207–08 (applying T.L.O.’s reasonable suspicion prong in the same
fashion to a similar problem).
124 To date, no court has answered the specific question of whether a school authority maintained a
reasonable scope in the search of a cell phone.
125 See 469 U.S. 325, 347 (1985).
122
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seem that a court would similarly uphold the reading of Pupil’s stored text
messages and e-mails, and likely even the incidental viewing of his photos and
notes, because Principal’s adopted measures for conducting the search—
looking through the stored contents accessible on the phone—were most likely
reasonably related to the search’s objective of finding evidence of
cyberbullying. This evidence could conceivably have been in the form of text
messages, e-mails, photos, or other forms of communication; therefore, a
search of the phone would reasonably—even necessarily—entail a search of
several different storage locations. It is difficult to envision a counterargument
that would rely on T.L.O.’s flexible definition of reasonable scope.126
Thus, a court applying the T.L.O. two-part test would almost certainly
uphold the constitutionality of Principal’s search. In doing so, however, the
court would accept three fundamental assumptions of T.L.O.’s analysis that are
crucial to justifying the minimal safeguards provided by this test—assumptions
that cell phones arguably confound, tipping the balance in favor of increased
safeguards to more effectively protect students. First, the T.L.O. Court assumed
that students’ legitimate expectations of privacy could be lower in terms of the
tangible items they brought into schools, an assumption challenged by the
unique capabilities and characteristics of cell phones. Second, the Court
assumed that school officials could actually limit their searches to tangible
locations reasonably related to the search’s objectives. Cell phones, however,
defy this assumption and destroy the effectiveness of the second T.L.O. prong
in limiting the intrusion effected by the school official’s search. Finally, the
Court contemplated imminent dangers associated with tangible objects that
necessitated immediate investigations by school authorities. The dangers posed
by cell phones, however, many times do not constitute such dire emergencies,
decreasing the reasonableness of urgent measures in response. The ultimate
126

Arguably, a court could construe the second prong of the T.L.O. test narrowly to find Principal’s
search unreasonable. A result rejecting the constitutionality of this kind of search, however, is highly unlikely
given the deference courts typically allow to schools, see Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct.
2633, 2643 (2009) (acknowledging that courts must always give a “high degree of deference . . . to the
educator’s professional judgment”), and what many scholars have deemed a pro-school attitude in the courts,
see Beci, supra note 55, at 844 (“In the school setting, the goal of enforcing public safety has dominated [the
balance between students’ rights and school interests].”); James, supra note 39 (“[T]hose arguing against the
validity of content searches of confiscated phones assume a heavy burden of persuasion because current
judicial attitudes uphold school policies that are designed to uncover and prevent misconduct by
students . . . .”). Ultimately, as Professor Mary Graw Leary has recognized, “[i]t would seem that the
combination of the low standard in T.L.O. combined with the decreased privacy rights and understandings of
privacy for these youth, may combine to allow access to vast amounts of personal data” in a cell phone search
at school. Mary Graw Leary, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy for Youth in a Digital Age, 80 MISS. L.J.
1035, 1088–89 (2011).

SPUNG GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

11/1/2011 1:10 PM

FROM BACKPACKS TO BLACKBERRIES

137

effect: Cell phone searches invade upon students’ expectations of privacy to a
degree the schools’ interests cannot justify, and thus are unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment without greater safeguards. This Part will explore these
three assumptions in turn.
A. The Case for Heightened Privacy Expectations in Cell Phones in Public
Schools
One fundamental assumption Justice White made in reducing students’
Fourth Amendment protections is that students carried only tangible items with
them to school. Indeed, the T.L.O. Court made clear the types of objects it had
in mind. White recognized that students reasonably carried textbooks, car and
house keys, money, and “the necessaries of personal hygiene and grooming,”
as well as purses, wallets, and occasionally “highly personal items” like letters
or diaries.127 In concurrence, Justice Blackmun hinted that the goal of search
and seizure in public schools was to respond quickly to the distracting “havoc”
caused by a “water pistol or peashooter” and their more dangerous
counterparts.128 Implicit in the court’s conception of items on students’ persons
during the school day was the assumption that the items and information
students carried were necessarily limited—students could carry only a finite
amount (based, perhaps, on the size of their backpacks), and these items were
correspondingly limited in the information they conveyed about the particular
student or that student’s associations, personal interests, or family life.129
Considering items of this nature, Justice White felt comfortable recognizing a
reduced expectation of privacy for students.130
As this section argues, however, this assumption is challenged by the
characteristics and capabilities of cell phones, ultimately increasing students’
privacy interests in these devices.

127

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
129 Cf. Chelsea Oxton, Note, The Search Incident to Arrest Exception Plays Catch Up: Why Police May
No Longer Search Cell Phones Incident to Arrest Without a Warrant, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1157, 1199
(2010) (arguing that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement has been wrongly
construed by many courts as allowing authorities to search the contents of cell phones, because the standard
was created “with a world of tangible evidence in mind . . . before the widespread use of cell phones”).
130 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338–39.
128
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1. The Capabilities and Characteristics of Students’ Cell Phones
Courts131 and commentators132 are beginning to recognize that cell phones
are simply different from the tangible objects that have thus far been subject to
Fourth Amendment searches. As the Ohio Supreme Court recently
acknowledged, for example, “there are legitimate concerns” with allowing
searches of cell phones without the typical Fourth Amendment safeguards
because these devices “allow for high-speed Internet access and are capable of
storing tremendous amounts of private data.”133 Justice Werdegar on the
California Supreme Court has also noted these concerns, writing that, while the
Fourth Amendment has allowed for reduced safeguards in some contexts based
on a balance of competing interests, “[t]oday, in the very different context of
mobile phones and related devices, that balance must be newly evaluated.”134
The argument encompasses two interwoven characteristics of cell phones.
First, cell phones’ storage capacities for all kinds of files “dwarf[] that which
can be carried on the person in a spatial container.”135 Second, the type of
information contained on students’ cell phones is often more personal than
anything students would have carried (or would have been able to carry) to
school in tangible containers.136
The quantity of information available to school administrators in searching
students’ cell phones is vastly greater than that available in tangible objects
like purses or backpacks. Even standard cell phones, which are somewhat less
sophisticated than the popular iPhone, BlackBerry, or Droid models, are
“capable of storing a wealth of digitized information” that could not have been
found in any physical object carried by a student.137 With such a tremendous
amount of varied information available on cell phones, the sheer number of
privacy intrusions of which school administrators are capable increases when
these officials conduct searches of the devices.138 To recall the model scenario,
131

See, e.g., State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949 (Ohio 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010).
See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone Meets the Fourth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. REV. 27, 40–
44 (2008).
133 Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954.
134 People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 513 (Cal. 2011) (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
135 Id. at 516.
136 Cf. Gershowitz, supra note 132, at 41–42 (noting the capacity to hold text messages, call histories,
pictures, e-mails, and potentially obscene videos).
137 See Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 954; Leary, supra note 126, at 1085–86.
138 See Leary, supra note 126, at 1085 (asserting that students’ expectations of privacy in their cell phones
at school may be shifting because “the amount of information available to a school official engaged in [a
search] has grown significantly”); Stillwagon, supra note 16, at 1199 (noting that cell phone searches “reveal
132
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for example, in searching for evidence of cyberbullying on Pupil’s cell phone,
Principal scrolled through several hundred of his text messages, read many of
his e-mails, and viewed several personal photos and private notes.139 The
amount of information accessible on the cell phone necessarily increases
Pupil’s expectation of privacy; Pupil has a far greater amount of individual
privacy interests in the phone that are potentially invaded by Principal’s search
than he would have were Principal to search a tangible container like a
backpack.
Concomitant with the quantity of information cell phones can store is the
personal nature of that information. Cell phones store records of conversations
and communications between students, incredibly detailed high-resolution
photos, and audio or video files.140 These methods allow students to “store
highly personal information” and “record their most private thoughts and
conversations on their cell phones,”141 sometimes in ways students could not
have in their tangible purses and backpacks—particularly because cell phones
allow students (and searching administrators) to access their Internet accounts
and review their Internet activities.142 A search of a cell phone thus may reveal
incredibly private e-mails, bank accounts, or privately held religious or
political affiliations,143 as well as information regarding students’ personal
relationships, sexual orientation, or medical records.144 Moreover, a cell phone
search could reveal information about a student’s family members that would
not have found its way into backpacks or purses—a privacy interest of
particular importance given the often-close relationship between parents and
school administrators in schools and in the community. Again using the model
scenario as an example, Principal’s search of Pupil’s iPhone revealed several
private e-mails (most of which Pupil would rather Principal not have seen due
to their sensitive nature), as well as photos and notes indicating Pupil’s
extracurricular activities, which he may not have wanted Principal to come
across.145 Principal also discovered a text message from Pupil’s mother
admitting a family financial situation; such information is often considered
information from several aspects of the owner’s life” and should demand heightened Fourth Amendment
protection in the absence of a warrant and probable cause requirement).
139 See supra Part I.C.
140 See Gershowitz, supra note 132, at 41–42.
141 People v. Diaz, 244 P.3d 501, 516 (Cal. 2011) (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
142 See Gershowitz, supra note 132, at 42; Mulligan, supra note 17, at 1576.
143 See Diaz, 244 P.3d at 513 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (“Never before has it been possible to carry so
much personal or business information in one’s pocket or purse.”).
144 See Gershowitz, supra note 132, at 44.
145 See supra Part I.C.
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extremely private, and it is easy to imagine his mother’s embarrassment upon
realizing that Principal was now privy to the circumstances, as well.
The increased quantity and more personal quality of information stored on
cell phones arguably should afford students a heightened legitimate
expectation of privacy in their contents146 because a school officials’ search
thereof necessarily entails an intrusion into a deeper and broader base of
privacy interests than a search of a tangible object could have, and the privacy
interests at stake are often more serious than the interests at stake in searching
a mere purse or backpack.147 Indeed, as one commentator has argued, “a ‘look’
into a cell phone’s memory can reveal ‘a subjective picture’ of our life”148 to a
far greater extent than previously imagined in the tangible objects students
carried with them in T.L.O.’s time. Students should enjoy a correspondingly
higher expectation of privacy in their phones than Justice White was willing to
recognize in students’ belongings at school,149 particularly given what some
suggest are schools’ duties to instill in students a respect for rights in a society
increasingly driven by technology.150
2. Cell Phones, Protected Speech, and Heightened Privacy Expectations
The case for a higher expectation of privacy than currently afforded under
the T.L.O. standard also encompasses expressive concerns embodied in the
First Amendment. As courts have recognized, many of the communications
students make on their electronic communication devices constitute expression
protected by the First Amendment against governmental abridgement,
particularly if the expression does not significantly affect the school
environment (and therefore presumptively lies beyond school officials’

146 See State v. Smith, 920 N.E.2d 949, 955 (Ohio 2009) (finding that cell phones’ “ability to store large
amounts of private data gives their users a reasonable and justifiable expectation of a higher level of privacy in
the information they contain”), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 102 (2010).
147 See Stillwagon, supra note 16, at 1199.
148 Id. at 1201 (quoting Hilary Hylton, What Your Cell Knows About You, TIME (Aug. 15, 2007),
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1653267,00.html) (internal quotation marks omitted).
149 Cf. Smith, 920 N.E.2d at 955 (holding that “because a person has a high expectation of privacy in a cell
phone’s contents, police must then obtain a warrant before intruding into the phone’s contents” under the
search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement).
150 See, e.g., Beci, supra note 55, at 833 (“Undoubtedly, the approaches tomorrow’s leaders will take
toward the [Fourth A]mendment will be shaped by the lessons they learn as today’s school children. Students
learn about the liberty, privacy, and security guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment more through actions than
words.” (footnote omitted)).
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control).151 Indeed, cell phones often contain records of political conversations,
religious activities, and other private communications, all of which constitute
traditionally protected speech.152 The storage of this often-sensitive protected
expression on students’ cell phones supports the argument that students enjoy a
heightened expectation of privacy in the devices’ contents.
Courts153 and scholars154 have often alluded to the traditional relationship
between the First Amendment and the Fourth Amendment, arguing that the
two provisions were designed at least to work together, if not directly
complement each other. As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, the Fourth
Amendment was adopted in part “to provide citizens with the privacy
protection necessary for secure enjoyment of First Amendment liberties.”155
The U.S. Supreme Court has also contemplated this relationship, at times
suggesting that the presence of materials protected by the First Amendment
gives rise to the need for rigorous, even heightened, Fourth Amendment
protection. The Court has suggested that settings and materials falling under
the protection of the First Amendment invoke the warrant requirement
“because we examine what is ‘unreasonable’ [under the Fourth Amendment] in

151 See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930–31 (3d Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (finding that a school district violated a student’s First Amendment rights when it disciplined the student
for off-campus expression that did not work a substantial disruption in school); Layshock ex rel. Layshock v.
Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (recognizing the “rather unremarkable
proposition” that students’ speech originating outside the school is protected by the First Amendment unless it
creates a substantial or foreseeable disruption in school); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48–50 (2d Cir.
2008) (recognizing that students’ electronic speech, at least when it originates outside the school, may be
protected by the First Amendment); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 39–40 (2d Cir. 2007) (same);
J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 863–67 (Pa. 2002) (same). The First Amendment provides,
in relevant part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
152 Notably, students’ speech that disrupts the school environment may not be protected by the First
Amendment. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) (“[C]onduct by the
student, in class or out of it, which for any reason . . . materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial
disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of speech.”). The issue here, however, is that cell phones will inevitably contain at least some
protected speech that does not disrupt the school environment, and students will therefore almost always have
First Amendment protection in at least some of the contents of their cell phones. See id. at 506 (“It can hardly
be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate.”).
153 See, e.g., Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504–06 (1973).
154 See, e.g., CLANCY, supra note 56, § 11.3.6.2, at 511; Mulligan, supra note 17, at 1587.
155 Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press v. AT&T Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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the light of the values of freedom of expression [protected by the First].”156
The theory, as Judge Kozinski has clarified, is that too low a standard under
the Fourth Amendment for a governmental search of an object implicating
protected expression would serve to “chill” the protected expression until the
low standard has the effect of a governmental abridgement of speech, thus
eviscerating the First Amendment’s freedoms.157
Many commentators argue that this relationship between the amendments
supports the idea that when a particular government agent’s search will turn up
communications or speech-related documents constituting expression protected
by the First Amendment, the government must then justify its search according
to a heightened level of suspicion or a more exact degree of particularity.158 As
Professor Akhil Amar has asserted, for example, the presence of First
Amendment concerns in a search should give rise to “special Fourth
Amendment safeguards” such as “heightened standards of justification prior to
searching.”159 Similarly, Professor Daniel Solove has suggested that such
concerns regarding the object or material to be searched (if the search falls into
an exception to the warrant requirement) should be infused into the
reasonableness balance that justifies the exception, such that the search’s
reasonableness “must be determined not only by reference to the reasonable
expectation of privacy test but also based on the extent to which First
Amendment activities are implicated.”160 The idea that the presence of First
Amendment materials may affect the reasonableness balance of a Fourth
Amendment exception has some basis in Supreme Court precedent, as well. In
Roaden v. Kentucky, for example, the Court acknowledged that a particular
Fourth Amendment intrusion was unreasonable “because prior restraint of the

156

Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504; accord Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 565 (1978) (“[P]rior
cases . . . insist that the courts apply the warrant requirements with particular exactitude when First
Amendment interests would be endangered by the search.”).
157 United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1018 (9th Cir. 2008) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge
Kozinski observed that “[t]he Founding generation recognized that the seizure of private
papers . . . undermines freedom of speech” and that “the chill on speech that would result from failing to
protect personal correspondence” would “compel every one in self-defence to write even to his dearest friends
with the cold and formal severity with which he would write to his wariest opponents.” Id. (quoting 2 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 626 (W. H.
Lyon, Jr. ed., Little, Brown, & Co. 14th ed. 1918) (1836)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
158 See, e.g., Patrick P. Garlinger, Note, Privacy, Free Speech, and the Patriot Act: First and Fourth
Amendment Limits on National Security Letters, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1105, 1145 (2009).
159 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 806 (1994).
160 Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 131 (2007).

SPUNG GALLEYSFINAL

2011]

11/1/2011 1:10 PM

FROM BACKPACKS TO BLACKBERRIES

143

right of expression . . . calls for a higher hurdle in the evaluation of
reasonableness” of the intrusion in question.161
While no consensus exists regarding exactly how the Fourth Amendment
should provide extra safeguards for protected expression, many courts and
scholars agree that First Amendment material should require a more
scrupulous level of protection under the Fourth Amendment, at least when both
the warrant and probable cause requirements are abrogated in a particular
context.162 The argument applies easily to school searches of cell phones.
Given that students’ cell phones contain tremendous amounts of more private
expressive material than Justice White imagined, greater First Amendment
protections are implicated against the chilling of students’ speech. When
infused into the reasonableness balance struck in T.L.O., the presence of these
First Amendment concerns support a higher expectation of privacy in students’
cell phones than has been previously recognized. Students learn that they have
a constitutional right to express themselves,163 and it flouts reason to
simultaneously teach this First Amendment protection and subject a primary
vehicle for such expression—students’ cell phones—to so low a Fourth
Amendment standard.

161 Roaden, 413 U.S. at 504 (emphasis added). In Roaden, the Court was addressing the seizure by law
enforcement authorities of objects that constituted expressive material protected by the First Amendment. Id.
at 503–04.
162 Notably, the Fourth Circuit has held that under the border exception to the Fourth Amendment
requirements, the presence of First Amendment materials does not affect the analysis. See United States v.
Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 506 (4th Cir. 2005). The court based its rejection of the First Amendment argument,
however, on the particular justifications of the border exception (which include the need to maintain national
security above almost any other competing concern). See id. Ickes also based its holding on a Supreme Court
case, id. at 507 (citing New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 874 (1986)), in which the Court declined to
give expressive material a higher standard than probable cause for warrant requirements, see P.J. Video, 475
U.S. at 874. However, as one commentator has pointed out, “the Court has never held that the First
Amendment could not force a heightening of Fourth Amendment protections that otherwise would fall below”
the usual warrant and probable cause requirements. Garlinger, supra note 158, at 1144.
163 See J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 854 (Pa. 2002) (“[F]ree speech is of special value
in the school setting. Schools offer a laboratory-like setting that encourages diverse thoughts.”); Patrick
Richard McKinney II, Note, On the School Board’s Hit List: Community Involvement in Protecting the First
and Fourth Amendment Rights of Public School Students, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1323, 1342 (2001) (“[T]he
inculcative function of the school prepares students to become productive members of society. Inculcation
involves passing on to students a set of norms, social and moral aims, [and] civic goals . . . .”).
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3. The Question of School Regulation: Phone Bans and the Expectation of
Privacy
While students should enjoy a heightened expectation of privacy in their
cell phones in schools, some argue that this expectation is erased—or, at the
very least, reduced—by many school policies that prohibit cell phones from
the premises during school hours.164 Pursuant to these policies, school
administrators regularly confiscate cell phones on sight.165 These rules, the
argument goes, thus reduce or eliminate students’ privacy expectations in their
cell phones at school.
Intuitively, this seems correct. If an object can be taken away simply for its
use or open possession, then how can students enjoy any expectation of
privacy in that object? This postulation, however, gives rise to the important
distinction between the physical object of a cell phone and the contents therein.
While students likely should expect very little privacy in the physical
possession of their cell phones given school policies prohibiting it, the ability
of a school administrator to physically take the phone does not destroy a
student’s expectation that the cell phone’s contents remain private.166 Indeed,
as a federal court has recently held, lawful confiscation of a cell phone
pursuant to school rules did not justify the subsequent search of the cell
phone’s contents under the Fourth Amendment.167 The violation of the
school’s prohibition of cell phones did not diminish the student’s expectation
of privacy in its contents.168
Thus, school policies banning the mere possession or use of cell phones
decrease students’ expectations of privacy in the cell phones themselves, but in
a typical case, the confiscation of a cell phone pursuant to these policies has no
logical connection to a search of the contents.
Some school policies may also clarify, using T.L.O.’s language, that
students’ cell phones are subject to search when an administrator has mere

164 See, e.g., Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (considering a
school policy prohibiting cell phones from classrooms and allowing their confiscation if seen by school
officials); Ito, supra note 2 (same).
165 See, e.g., Klump, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 630.
166 Cf. United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1089 (10th Cir.) (“[A] notable distinction may exist
between authority to seize a computer and authority to search its contents.”), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1028
(2009).
167 See Klump, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 640–41.
168 See id.
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reasonable suspicion to do so.169 Arguably, under this type of policy, students
should expect less privacy in the contents of their cell phones because the
school has effectively given students “advance notice” that their devices’
contents can be searched.170 Indeed, in situations in which students are given
such notice of decreased privacy, school officials have typically been justified
in searching the areas about which notice was given.171
The theory underlying these decreased privacy expectations, however,
indicates why students retain a heightened expectation of privacy in their cell
phones’ contents, regardless of the notice their schools give them. As Professor
Wayne LaFave observes, if schools give students advance notice that lockers
are subject to search when a particular student is suspected of violating school
rules, students must expect reduced privacy in these lockers because the notice
“provides the student with an opportunity to limit the effect of the intrusion by
not keeping highly personal materials in the locker.”172 The same theory may
apply to any other physical containers students can carry into school. In other
words, the basis of a reduced expectation of privacy in certain objects at school
is that students can somehow search-proof these items or leave particularly
personal items at home to limit the intrusiveness of any potential search.
The reasoning dissipates when applied to students’ cell phones. By their
nature, cell phones are all-inclusive. Students do not carry a different phone
into school with them than those they carry during other aspects of their lives,
and they do not have any way of separating out the personal contents of a cell
phone to avoid subjecting these materials to potential search. Commonly
among students, to use a cell phone is to store large amounts of personal
information on it. In the model scenario, for example, Pupil’s phone contained
photos of his extracurricular activities, hundreds of texts unrelated to the
suspicion for which it was searched, and several similar e-mails,173 all of which
were inseparable from the phone itself. While students certainly could delete
the personal contents of the phone (and on their e-mail accounts or Internet
browser histories) before entering school doors or leave their phones at home,
169

See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 20; Whittenberg, supra note 2.
Cf. LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11(b), at 506–07 (noting that school policies providing “advance
notice” of searches decrease students’ privacy expectations in lockers).
171 See William G. Buss, The Fourth Amendment and Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IOWA L.
REV. 739, 765 (1974) (“[W]hen the balance between privacy and law enforcement interests is extremely close,
a regulation giving the student advance notice of a possible search may tend to swing the balance away from
the student’s interest in privacy.”).
172 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11(b), at 507.
173 See supra Part I.C.
170
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this seems an unreasonable price to pay considering the vital role cell phones
now play in students’ personal, social, family, and extracurricular lives.
Ultimately, school policies that give students notice of a lesser expectation
of privacy in their cell phones wrongly assume that students can limit the
information stored on the devices to that in which they are willing to give up
their privacy expectations. As students cannot effectively search-proof their
phones, however, these policies should do nothing to reduce students’
expectations of privacy in the contents thereon.
4. Distinguishing Diaries
It may also be contended that Justice White contemplated tangible items
with the same type of privacy implications as cell phones by acknowledging
that students may carry “photographs, letters, and diaries” with them in their
purses or backpacks.174 Arguably, then, the privacy interests of cell phones are
indistinguishable from the privacy interests considered in T.L.O.’s calculus,
and students do not have any higher of an expectation of privacy in their cell
phones than they would in these admittedly private, tangible objects. This
argument is unconvincing, however, for two reasons.
First, though Justice White contemplated in dicta these personal items in
reducing privacy expectations, he distinguished these items from those that
students had to carry by necessity. While “[s]tudents at a minimum must bring
to school . . . supplies needed for their studies, . . . keys, money, and the
necessaries of personal hygiene and grooming,” he wrote, “students may carry
on their persons” the far more private items listed above.175 Implicit in this
distinction is the idea that, should students choose to carry these non-necessary
items, they must expect less privacy because they could have chosen to leave
them at home and are effectively on notice that—by virtue of these items’
presence in school—administrators may search through them if justified
according to the T.L.O. standard. As established above, however, a student
cannot distinguish the private and non-private contents of her cell phone; mere
“advance notice” should not reduce a student’s privacy expectations in these
complicated, all-purpose devices. A cell phone renders a highly personal item
(like a diary) indivisible from less personal information, and Justice White’s
assumption of this separability should fail to justify a lowered expectation of
privacy in today’s cell phones.
174
175

New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).
Id. (dictum) (emphases added).
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Second, even accepting arguendo that Justice White’s mention of diaries
refutes the heightened privacy students expect in the contents of their cell
phones, the argument still ignores the concept that the quality of personal
information cannot be separated from the quantity of such information on these
devices in recognizing students’ heightened privacy expectations.176 The
increased expectations are not based merely on the idea that the information
stored on a cell phone is often of a more personal nature than that which could
(or would) have been stored in tangible containers at school but also on the
concurrent argument that there is simply a greater amount and variety of this
kind of information accessible to a searching official. A diary is limited in
capacity and use, whereas a cell phone combines the functions of a massive
diary, an extensive photo album, a notebook containing thousands of records of
communications, and a variety of other features. Students may expect a greater
degree of privacy in the combination of these features because there are more
privacy interests at stake than Justice White considered.
B. The Impossibility of a Reasonable Scope
The unique characteristics and capabilities of cell phones thus support a
more robust expectation of privacy than T.L.O. allowed in contemplating the
tangible objects students brought to school in 1985. These heightened
expectations of privacy upset the delicate balance struck by Justice White and
the T.L.O. majority, which considered only students’ purses and backpacks,
and the types of contents that could reasonably be found therein. Cell phones
also confound the T.L.O. balance in another way. This section argues that the
increased sophistication of cell phone contents, functions, and interfaces
potentially subjects students to a greater degree of intrusion upon their privacy
expectations.
As the previous section indicated, cell phones store a wide variety of
personal information, most of which is generally accessible to an equal degree
on the phone. As the Tenth Circuit has recognized in the analogous context of
laptop computers, “Because computers can hold so much information touching
on many different areas of a person’s life, there is a greater potential for the
‘intermingling’ of documents and a consequent invasion of privacy when
[government authorities] execute a search for evidence on a computer.”177 This

176

See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001); accord Leary, supra note 126, at 1085–86
(noting that physical objects necessarily limit the scope of an invasion—as in T.L.O. and Redding, where the
177
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heightened potential intrusion into the often-jumbled private contents of
students’ cell phones becomes particularly acute in the hands of school
administrators, who may be unfamiliar with the latest models and interfaces of
cell phones and lack training in conducting such sophisticated searches. Thus,
the potential is high that school officials will come across an enormous amount
of information, straying outside the reasonable-scope command of T.L.O. and
effecting an intrusion upon students’ privacy expectations far greater than
intended.
Indeed, in requiring school authorities to confine their search of students’
belongings to a reasonable scope,178 the T.L.O. Court assumed that school
officials were in fact capable of doing so. As a practical matter, however, it
may be unreasonable to expect that administrators can navigate through an
iPhone’s contents to locate incriminating evidence without viewing a wide
swath of unrelated, highly personal items. The operation of cell phones, though
often advertised as user-friendly, may be impossibly unfamiliar to those
(undoubtedly including many school officials) who do not own the latest
models or have not been trained to search them. In the model case, for
example, Principal scrolled through hundreds of texts unrelated to the reasons
for the investigation and unintentionally stumbled through various storage
locations within the cell phone, simply out of lack of experience in using the
iPhone’s interface.179 The T.L.O. Court, contemplating an obsolete era of
tangible possessions, believed that school officials had the expertise (or at least
the common-sense ability) to pick through the contents of students’ physical
belongings and consciously limit the scope of their intrusions into students’
private places. The increasing complexity of cell phones renders this
assumption untenable.
The primary concern with the potential inability of school officials to
confine a cell phone search to a reasonable scope is that it generally raises the
degree of intrusion students are forced to accept. As the cases from T.L.O. to
Redding suggest, the degree to which school officials will invade upon a
students’ privacy throughout the course of a search, in addition to the pure
privacy a student expects, may affect the calculus in a given case. In Acton and
Earls, for example, the intrusion was “negligible”180 and “minimal[].”181 In
intrusion was limited to items that could fit within a purse or backpack—in ways that content stored digitally
cannot).
178 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
179 See supra Part I.C.
180 Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995).
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Redding, on the other hand, the strip search was “degrading” and a far greater
intrusion into the student’s privacy, as is any strip search.182 These holdings
indicate that, when students are subject to greater intrusions upon their
legitimate expectations of privacy, Fourth Amendment safeguards must be
heightened in response. Indeed, as the Supreme Court noted in Redding, the
particular intrusiveness of the strip search in question made it “categorically
distinct, requiring distinct elements of justification on the part of school
authorities.”183 If the government interest does not meet these more rigorous
burdens to justify the search,184 then the search is unreasonable. In the case of
cell phones, there is great potential for the invasion of multiple privacy
interests unrelated to the objectives of the search. This potential supports the
notion that higher Fourth Amendment standards should be imposed upon cell
phone searches in the public school environment, given the amount of privacy
interests at stake and the reduced standard that T.L.O. established.185
C. Schools’ Insufficient Interests to Justify Cell Phone Searches
Due to the unique characteristics of cell phones and the difficulty in
conducting constitutional searches of them without higher and more
particularized safeguards in place, students’ privacy interests in the contents of
these devices against school officials’ searches are far stronger than Justice
White recognized in T.L.O. That established, this section now looks to the
opposite side of the T.L.O. balancing equation and argues that schools’ needs
to search the contents of students’ cell phones no longer match the degree of
intrusion upon these heightened expectations of privacy.
As an initial point, while the T.L.O. majority based the reduced Fourth
Amendment standard for justifying searches on the need for school officials to
exercise discretion in preserving “order and a proper educational
environment,”186 the opinion made clear the particular “ugly forms” of

181

Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002).
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2641–43 (2009).
183 Id. at 2643.
184 In Redding, the heightened burdens that school officials failed to meet seemed to be a higher—or at
least more exact—degree of suspicion to justify the intrusiveness of requiring a student to undress to her
underwear and expose the private parts of her body. See id. at 2641–43.
185 Cf. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding under the search-incident-toarrest exception to the warrant requirement that, when “officers come across relevant documents so
intermingled with irrelevant documents that they cannot feasibly be sorted at the site,” higher safeguards are
needed).
186 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).
182
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disciplinary problems about which it was truly concerned: drug use and violent
crime.187 The Court thus indicated that the social problems allowing the
school’s interest to match a student’s expectation of privacy involved tangible
objects that, if not confiscated upon an immediate search of a student’s person
or belongings, would continue to pose an imminent danger (or at least an
illegal distraction) to the school.188 In the majority of cases in which a school
official will need to search a student’s cell phone, however, the school official
is not justified by the same immediate concerns because the digital files stored
on cell phones simply do not pose an imminent tangible danger to other
students or the school environment. In the model scenario, for example,
Principal suspected that Pupil’s cell phone contained evidence of
cyberbullying,189 an activity that may pose relational and emotional harm to
the targeted student but certainly does not necessitate the same immediate
search in which Principal would have had to engage if Pupil was suspected of
possessing a gun or knife. When a school official’s highly intrusive search of a
student is missing the threat of grave and imminent danger (or at least
significant disruption) to other students or the school environment, the
intrusion is difficult to justify.190
Even accepting Justice White’s reasoning on its face and allowing that
school officials must possess the discretion to quickly search students’
possessions to quell any significant disruptions to the school environment, the
application to cell phones still fails to some extent because the confiscation of
a cell phone arguably neutralizes any threat the phone may have to
maintenance of school order. In many situations—for example, when a student
observably uses the cell phone during class time—the student’s ability to use
the phone in the offensive way ceases when the school official takes
possession of the phone, and a search of the phone’s contents is not logically
justified to maintain order in the school.

187

Id.
Justice Blackmun also expressed concern about water pistols and peashooters—or, more generally,
about tangible items that could cause distractions in the classroom but did not necessarily constitute illegal and
dangerous possessions like drugs or weapons. See id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
189 See supra Part I.C.
190 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2642–43 (2009) (finding the school
official’s search unjustified in part because the object of the search did not reasonably pose any “danger to the
students”); see also LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11, at 64 (4th ed. Supp. 2010) (noting that a factor missing
from the facts in Redding was an indication of immediate danger from the power of the drugs that the student
was suspected of possessing).
188
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Realistically, of course, these two arguments may ignore some situations in
which a school administrator is faced with searching a cell phone for evidence
of drug activity, such as a few incriminating text messages, a photo of an item
of drug paraphernalia, or perhaps a personal note stored on the phone listing
individuals that owe money to the cell phone’s owner.191 Here, it seems,
neither of the arguments posited above apply. As T.L.O. arguably emphasizes
schools’ need to quell drug use, the school officials’ legitimate interests
recognized in T.L.O. do not seem to be mitigated in a search of a cell phone’s
contents for exactly that purpose. Moreover, searches for evidence of drugs,
according to the T.L.O. majority, seemed a sufficient government purpose to
justify an immediate intrusion of the baseline level of privacy expectations
students maintain in their tangible belongings.192 Thus, it is difficult to argue
that a school’s interests have diminished when searching cell phones for
evidence of drug use, possession, or dealing.
The fact that schools maintain an important interest in this situation,
however, does not repair the damage cell phones work to the T.L.O. balance.
While schools’ interests may not have decreased in investigating drug use,
these interests have also not increased to match the heightened expectations of
privacy students enjoy in their cell phones and the more significant intrusion
upon those expectations that a search of the devices would entail. Indeed, the
governmental interest in searching cell phones for evidence of drug activity is
the same specific interest considered in T.L.O. Though this interest then
exceeded students’ privacy expectations in their tangible belongings, thus
justifying a standard far less than the normal Fourth Amendment requirements,
the interest now falls short of the heightened privacy students expect in their
cell phones, and the reduced Fourth Amendment standard remains inadequate
to protect students’ altered privacy expectations in these devices. Ultimately,
even in drug-investigation scenarios, schools’ interests do not justify the low
standards established by the T.L.O. Court. The balance has changed, and the
T.L.O. standard is insufficient to protect students’ rights.193
191

T.L.O. dealt with the tangible equivalent of these types of evidence. 469 U.S. at 328.
See id. at 339–43.
193 There may be instances in which schools, with reasonable suspicion, need to search cell phones for
evidence of an extreme threat to school safety (for example, a stored photo of a pipe bomb hidden in the
school). The proposition that this kind of circumstance tosses aside any careful balancing analysis and justifies
a search based on sheer urgency is generally accepted. See, e.g., ACLU Applauds Boulder Valley School
District’s Decision to Limit Searches of Students’ Cell Phone Text Messages, ACLU (Apr. 21, 2008),
http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/aclu-applauds-boulder-valley-school-districts-decision-limitsearches-student [hereinafter ACLU Applauds School District]. These imminent-threat situations may call for
an exception to the argument that cell phones demand higher safeguards than currently provided under T.L.O.
192
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IV. PROTECTING STUDENTS’ RIGHTS: THE SEARCH FOR FEASIBLE SOLUTIONS
To this point, this Comment has established that the T.L.O. calculus
justifying the elimination of the warrant requirement and the abrogation of the
probable cause requirement in school searches is insufficient to protect the
privacy students reasonably expect in their cell phones against school officials’
intrusions. Thus, higher safeguards under the Fourth Amendment are needed to
fully respect these rights.194 This Part explores possible solutions for raising
safeguards and protecting students’ privacy expectations, beginning with the
first that may come to mind: the reinstatement of the warrant requirement for
school officials’ searches of cell phones.
A. Reinstating the Warrant Requirement: An Infeasible Solution
As a starting point, it may be posited that the way to repair the Fourth
Amendment standard in schools is to reinstate the warrant requirement for cell
phone searches. School officials would, under this suggestion, be required to
request a warrant from a magistrate judge declaring the facts giving rise to
sufficient individualized suspicion and stating, with particularity, the specific
files that the cell phone search intends to turn up. While conceivable in theory,
however, the imposition of a warrant requirement is highly impractical and
would likely fail to protect students’ Fourth Amendment rights to any greater
degree.
First, T.L.O. makes clear that, regardless of the balancing inquiry, the
warrant requirement is simply ill fit for school officials’ searches of students’
belongings. As Justice White conclusively stated, “[t]he warrant
requirement . . . is unsuited to the school environment” because “requiring a
teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction
of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the
schools.”195 In the years since T.L.O., this categorical recognition of the
infeasibility of the warrant requirement in schools has become entrenched.196 It
194 Notably, there may be some contention that any solution to the problem outlined in this Comment
would essentially function as an “exception to the exception” and lead to a confusing array of standards
depending on the type of object searched, as the door would be opened to further litigation offering various
theories similar to the one advanced herein. This scenario is a possibility. The Supreme Court, however, has
not hesitated to carve such an exception within the T.L.O. doctrine when the balancing act favors the student’s
rights over the school’s interests. See Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633.
195 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
196 See LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11(e), at 539.
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is highly unlikely, even with the need for higher Fourth Amendment
protections in cell phones, that any court, state legislature, or school board
would even consider such an audacious measure.
Furthermore, it is unclear exactly how a reinstatement of the warrant
requirement would actually protect students’ privacy expectations in their cell
phones. The purpose of the warrant has traditionally been recognized as
twofold.197 First, a warrant “provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral
magistrate, and thus ensures an objective determination whether an intrusion is
justified in any given case.”198 Given the deference with which courts are
typically required to treat school officials’ judgments,199 however, courts are
quite likely to grant a warrant request in almost any situation—particularly if
probable cause is not required to justify the search. Second, “[a] warrant
assures the citizen that the intrusion is authorized by law, and that it is
narrowly limited in its objectives and scope.”200 The logistical problems of
navigating through the information contained in cell phones,201 however,
conceivably erase the intended perception of legitimacy in the cell phone
owner’s mind. If a school official cannot selectively pick through a cell
phone’s contents without coming across any number of protected files or data,
it is unclear how a warrant would assure any greater degree of particularity.
B. Requiring Probable Cause in Cell Phone Searches
As an alternative to the ill-fitting warrant requirement, courts could require
administrators to articulate probable cause before engaging in any cell phone
search—the official would have to know of “facts and circumstances,” based
on “reasonably trustworthy information,” that are “sufficient in themselves to
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that” the cell phone contains
evidence of a violation of school rules or criminal law.202
The virtue of requiring probable cause is that it forces the school official to
justify the cell phone search on more than the amorphous reasonable suspicion
test set out in T.L.O., thus ostensibly requiring a stronger, more articulated
197

See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967).
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989) (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 9 (1977)).
199 See supra note 126.
200 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622.
201 See discussion supra Part III.B.
202 See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639 (2009) (quoting Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
198
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government interest to match the degree to which the search may intrude upon
students’ privacy expectations. This higher safeguard, therefore, would better
reflect the shift that cell phones have caused in the T.L.O. balancing equation.
Moreover, courts are likely to find probable cause a more feasible safeguard
than a warrant; unlike the warrant requirement, probable cause is not
necessarily unsuited for the school environment. While T.L.O. rejected such a
requirement for school administrators, it did so after determining that the
school’s interest needed to meet only a heavily reduced expectation of
privacy203 and did not—and perhaps could not—explain why the probable
cause standard was inappropriate to the school environment in general.204 With
a new evaluation of students’ privacy expectations, however, comes a new
evaluation of the standard the government must meet to match them, and it is
reasonable to believe that school officials (perhaps with training) could
understand and apply the standard in justifying a cell phone search.205
Arguably, however, probable cause still provides an unclear standard that
may fail to protect students’ rights to any greater degree based, perhaps, on the
willingness of school administrators to make the circumstances fit the standard.
Indeed, LaFave has observed that, even in T.L.O., Choplick would likely have
been able to justify the search under a probable cause standard.206 Consider
again the model case.207 Principal had information from an ostensibly reliable
source (a student in good standing at the school) that Pupil was sending
harassing material to another student through the communication modes
available on his iPhone. When asked, Pupil denied the accusations. Principal
undoubtedly had reasonable suspicion to justify the search under T.L.O.208—
but if her legal judgment were ever questioned, it would be difficult to
conclude that she did not have probable cause, as well. Principal had
knowledge based on the reliable third-party report that was arguably sufficient

203

See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985).
See LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11(b), at 498 (observing that T.L.O. “simply assume[d] that the
‘school setting also requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a
search,’” but “[t]he basis of this assumption is never explained” (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340)).
205 Indeed, some state courts have required probable cause under certain circumstances in the school
environment. See, e.g., State v. Heirtzler, 789 A.2d 634, 640 (N.H. 2001) (holding that when “school officials
agree to take on the mantle of criminal investigation and enforcement . . . they should be charged with abiding
by the constitutional protections required in criminal investigations,” including probable cause); see also
LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11(b), at 511 (noting that the probable cause requirement remains in school
searches if law enforcement officials are involved “in a significant way”).
206 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11(b), at 498.
207 See supra Part I.C.
208 See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
204
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to justify a belief that Pupil had violated City High School’s antibullying
policy. It is a close call, and as courts allow substantial deference to school
officials’ decisions,209 Principal could argue that she was justified even under a
higher standard.
As the scenario demonstrates, it is unclear in which situations the probable
cause standard would actually provide greater protection for students’ privacy
expectations in their cell phones. While probable cause could repair the
disparity between schools’ interests and students’ privacy expectations, the
fact-intensive inquiry it requires and the deference inherent in courts’
evaluation of school officials’ decisions could often render probable cause an
illusory safeguard.

C. State Legislatures and School Boards
Another potential solution calls upon state legislatures and school boards,
rather than courts, to develop the necessary safeguards for respecting students’
privacy expectations, either under the Fourth Amendment or state
constitutional or statutory equivalents.210 Arguably, because state legislatures
and school boards are stitched into the fabric of local democratic processes,
they are more familiar with school issues, and are therefore better able to
recognize students’ heightened privacy expectations and provide higher
standards for searches in response. As a result, the outcome of these local
bodies’ deliberations in protecting students’ rights will be perceived as
somewhat more legitimate than courts’ holdings on the matter, an aspect of
school disciplinary programs that at least one Supreme Court Justice has
identified as important to the analysis.211 Thus, state legislatures can mandate,
and school boards can implement, the safeguards necessary to recognize the
adjusted balance between students’ privacy expectations and schools’ interests.
Some may question whether these governing bodies would incorporate the
proper safeguards in schools. As Professor Adam Gershowitz has observed,
state legislatures are typically loath to impede upon authorities’ discretion,

209

See supra note 126.
See Gershowitz, supra note 132, at 51 (suggesting that state legislatures play a role in limiting law
enforcement officers’ discretion under the search-incident-to-arrest exception).
211 See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 841 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting the importance of
the democratic process engaged in by the school board in cases of “close question[s] involving the
interpretation of constitutional values”).
210
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particularly in the area of law enforcement.212 Students’ privacy
expectations—the protection of which is guaranteed as a matter of
constitutional law—would potentially be compromised by school boards or
state legislatures siding with school officials’ demands to maintain disciplinary
flexibility.
It may be equally true, however, that state legislators or school board
members are better equipped than judges to understand the privacy concerns
associated with cell phones.213 Often belonging to the cell-phone-owning
demographic, these individuals may personally relate to the privacy interests
inherent in cell phones,214 particularly for students. Moreover, school board
members and state legislators are likely more responsive to worried parents,215
who may be concerned about protecting the information on their students’ cell
phones from prying school authorities.216 In fact, some state legislatures and
school boards have thus far shown a willingness to accommodate the privacy
concerns associated with cell phone searches by adapting their policies to
reflect these issues. A Colorado school district, for example, recently imposed
greater safeguards than reasonable suspicion in these searches in response to a
groundswell of opposition to the searches based on the reduced T.L.O. standard
alone.217 It may be that these bodies are more responsive than courts to the
privacy expectations of their constituents and more capable of developing
agreeable solutions to respect these rights in schools.
D. The Requirement of Parental Consent
A final solution that courts—or state legislatures and school boards, as
discussed in the previous section—could consider to protect students’ privacy
expectations involves requiring parental notification and consent before a
school official can search a student’s cell phone. This safeguard would require
212 See Gershowitz, supra note 132, at 51 (“Legislatures are not typically in the business of limiting police
officers’ ability to conduct criminal investigations.” (citing Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote
Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the
Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079 (1993))).
213 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case
for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 858–59 (2004) (noting that courts “cannot readily understand how the
technologies may develop, cannot easily appreciate context, and often cannot even recognize whether the facts
of the case before them raise privacy implications that happen to be typical or atypical,” and thus state
legislatures should play a greater role in developing privacy safeguards for new technologies).
214 See Gershowitz, supra note 132, at 51–52.
215 See id. at 53 (noting the need to please constituents).
216 See Unmuth, supra note 2; Whittenberg, supra note 2.
217 See ACLU Applauds School District, supra note 193.
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an administrator, when considering the search of a student’s cell phone, to first
call the student’s parent or guardian (using school directory information and a
school-provided phone) and describe the suspicion giving rise to the need to
conduct a search. The administrator could then allow the parent to give consent
for the search, object to the search generally, or specify the steps the
administrator could take to limit the search to the intended areas. Indeed, the
parent could even walk the administrator through the search either in person or
over the phone, effectively limiting the intrusion into private areas of the phone
not related to the object of the search.
There are several benefits to this type of safeguard. As an initial matter, the
policy recognizes that parents, in most situations, are the true owners of the
cell phone and therefore are, as a matter of propriety, the individuals in the best
position to sign off on a search through its contents. The policy also recognizes
that a cell phone search is not just an intrusion upon the students’ privacy
rights, but an intrusion upon the privacy expectations of the family to which
the student belongs.
In substance, moreover, justifying a search through parental consent relies
not on the balancing process of pitting the students’ privacy against the
school’s interest, but on the doctrine of in loco parentis; if the school has the
permission of the parent to act as the parent, then it may ignore the student’s
privacy expectations to the extent that the parent has specified, increasing the
fluidity and effectiveness of the search.218 As mentioned above, involving the
parent in the process may limit the degree of intrusion by providing greater
particularity as to the places searched. Finally, involving the parent may serve
to build trust between the school and its constituents, a necessary element of
the inculcation function of the public education system.
A major shortcoming here is what a school official may do if a parent
wholly objects to the search. At this point, the official would need to justify the
search using traditional Fourth Amendment principles, destroying the
effectiveness of a parental consent requirement and still leaving a student in
need of heightened Fourth Amendment protection against an administrator’s
218 The doctrine of in loco parentis posits that a parent may “delegate part of his parental authority . . . to
the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who . . . then . . . has such a portion of the power of the parent
committed to his charge.” LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 10.11(a), at 486 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *453). Cases following T.L.O., however, dismissed the doctrine’s full application to public
schools. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995) (“In T.L.O., we rejected the notion
that public schools . . . exercise only parental power over their students, which of course is not subject to
constitutional constraints.” (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985))).
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cell phone search. Thus, while a parental consent requirement could provide a
partial solution, full respect for students’ increased expectations of privacy in
their cell phones likely demands a more holistic program of safeguards.
Another possible limitation on this safeguard is that a small percentage of
students (typically those who are in their final year of secondary education)
have reached the age of majority, thus calling into question whether parents
can provide the necessary consent. It is likely, however, that parents can still
serve this function if they retain the same degree of control over their adult
student.219 That parents can still give consent is particularly evident if they own
the cell phone and pay for the plan, as is often the case even after their student
becomes a legal adult.
CONCLUSION
The troubling question of how cell phones fit into broad Fourth
Amendment doctrine has been debated in the last few years. Some aspects of
the argument advanced herein have been suggested, in somewhat scattershot
fashion, in a relatively young body of case law and commentary addressing
other exceptions to the typical Fourth Amendment requirement of a warrant
and probable cause. While acknowledging some of these propositions, this
Comment’s argument applies only to the untested particularities of the public
school exception established in T.L.O.
Thus, this Comment sets forth the argument that, in light of the
characteristics and capabilities of students’ cell phones, the T.L.O. standard for
guiding school officials’ searches under the Fourth Amendment fails to
recognize students’ heightened expectations of privacy in the devices, the
greater degree to which school officials can intrude upon these expectations,
and the insufficiency of schools’ interests in justifying these intrusions.
Therefore, higher safeguards, such as the articulation of probable cause, the
requirement of parental notification and consent, or the development of more
customized safeguards by local democratic processes, must be considered and

219 See, e.g., United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 720–21 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that a parent had
apparent authority to consent to the search of his 51-year-old son’s room when he did not pay rent, when the
parent had unrestricted access to the bedroom, and where the parent paid for Internet access that his son used).
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applied to better protect the privacy students expect in their cell phones as
these devices pervade every aspect of students’ lives—including the hallways
of public schools.
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